The medium-weight brigade structure and the transformation of the U.S. Army and the Army of Ukraine by Kyrylenko, Mykhailo.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2001-03
The medium-weight brigade structure and the
transformation of the U.S. Army and the Army of Ukraine.
Kyrylenko, Mykhailo.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/10837
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
Monterey, California 
THESIS 
THE MEDIUM-WEIGHT BRIGADE STRUCTURE AND THE 





Thesis Co- Advisors: Donald Abenheim 
Thomas-Durrel Young 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
20010529 037 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved           OMB No. 0704- 
0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for 
reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the 
collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, 
including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and 
Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, 
Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2.  REPORT DATE 
March 2001 
3.  REPORT TYPE AND DATES 
COVERED 
Master's Thesis 
4.   TITLE   AND   SUBTITLE:   The   Medium-Weight  Brigade   Structure   and   the 
Transformation of the U.S. Army and the Army of Ukraine 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
6.  AUTHOR (S) 
Mykhailo Kyrylenko 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME (S) AND ADDRESS (ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER 
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING / MONITORING 
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of 
Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13.   ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) 
The U.S. Army has faced many formidable decisions on how best to transform. The fundamental changes in the strategic 
environment after the Cold War, crucial advances in technology and military doctrine related to the Gulf War and permanent 
involvement in peacekeeping/peacemaking operations around the world have led to a more flexible and lethal force structure. An 
army should maintain the capability for conducting various military operations from small-scale contingencies to major theaters of 
war. Therefore, based on major changes in the strategic environment—a dismantled Warsaw Pact, increasing asymmetrical threats, 
budget constrains along with frequent involvement in contingency operations—the U.S. Army once more confronts transformation 
and reorganization. 
This thesis focuses on the current transformation of the U.S. Army to examine the history of reorganizing the U.S. Army along 
with the dynamics of reforming the Ukrainian Army. This thesis explores why a "medium-weight brigade-size" force structure 
became the key feature of the U.S. Army's transformation strategy for forces of the 21st century namely, the "Objective Forces." The 
main intention of this thesis is to reach conclusions about how the U.S. Army's transformation experience can be applied to the 
current process of developing the Army of Ukraine. 
14.    SUBJECT TERMS 
United States, Ukraine, The Transformation of the U.S. Army, The Initial Brigade Combat Team, 
The State Program of Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. 
15. NUMBER OF PAGES 
146 
16. PRICE CODE 
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 
OF REPORT 
Unclassified 
18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 










Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
u 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
THE MEDIUM-WEIGHT BRIGADE STRUCTURE AND 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE U.S. ARMY AND 
THE ARMY OF UKRAINE 
Mykhailo Kyrylenko 
Lieutenant Colonel, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine 
B.S., San-Petersburg, The High Military College, 1986 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 
AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
from the 




Donald Abenheim, Thesis Co-Advisor 
2SS^~^ " oh 
Thomas-Durrel Young, Thesis Co-Advisor 
James J. Wirtz, Chairman 
Department of National Security Affairs 
111 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
IV 
ABSTRACT 
The U.S. Army has faced many formidable decisions on how best to transform. 
The fundamental changes in the strategic environment after the Cold War, crucial 
advances in technology and military doctrine related to the Gulf War and permanent 
involvement in peacekeeping/peacemaking operations around the world have led to a 
more flexible and lethal force structure. An army should maintain the capability for 
conducting various military operations from small-scale contingencies to major theaters 
of war. Therefore, based on major changes in the strategic environment—a dismantled 
Warsaw Pact, increasing asymmetrical threats, budget constrains along with frequent 
involvement in contingency operations—the U.S. Army once more confronts 
transformation and reorganization. 
This thesis focuses on the current transformation of the U.S. Army to examine the 
history of reorganizing the U.S. Army along with the dynamics of reforming the 
Ukrainian Army. This thesis explores why a "medium-weight brigade-size" force 
structure became the key feature of the U.S. Army's transformation strategy for forces of 
the 21st century namely the "Objective Forces." The main intention of this thesis is to 
reach conclusions about how the U.S. Army's transformation experience can be applied 
to the current process of developing the Army of Ukraine. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
When answering questions that have been used to frame this thesis, it is necessary 
to remember that while periods of peace should be respected, peace is not a permanent 
condition in world affairs. Recent events suggest that the time and opportunity to prepare 
for future conflicts may not last as long as many had hoped a few years ago. Even small 
nations can no longer be prevented from building total war capacity—whether nuclear or 
conventional. What is worse, new technologies make it possible even for small groups of 
perpetrators to inflict ever more chaos and dangers for nations around the world. 
The termination of the Cold War was marked by new calls for international safety, 
threats which include the increased distribution of the technology of producing weapons 
of mass destruction and systems of their delivery, clandestine migration, and narcotic 
trafficking, political, and religious extremism. All together, these factors are capable, 
under certain conditions, of requiring military counter-measures to counter threats to the 
national security of the United States and to Ukraine as well. 
As a matter of fact, the U.S. Army has undergone at least five major 
reorganizations since the end of World War II. For several decades up to the Gulf War, 
the U.S. Army focused on rebuilding its forces and adjusting doctrine for conventional 
war, especially the defense of Western Europe against a possible attack by Warsaw Pact 
forces. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the apparent end of the Cold War presented 
threats that were more ambiguous and regionally focused and brought significant changes 
to the world and the U.S. Army. 
xv 
However, the U.S. Army remained configured according to its Cold War 
structure: either very heavy armored and mechanized units armed with large numbers of 
heavy tracked vehicles or very light infantry-type units that were primarily foot mobile. 
In fact, the improvements in tactical mobility of the U.S. Army came at the expense of its 
strategic mobility. The U.S. Army became progressively heavier and more difficult to 
deploy. 
Moreover, the Gulf War exposed several features of the U.S. Army's light-heavy 
force structure. The most significant among them was the absence of medium-weight 
force structure, which would be able to combine the excellent strategic mobility, rapid 
deployability of the light-infantry divisions, and overwhelming operational mobility, 
lethality and survivability of the heavy-armored force. 
The experience earned from the Gulf War and from the recent peacekeeping and 
peacemaking operations in the Balkans reaffirmed that the U.S. Army has lacked the 
medium forces that combine a degree of mobility, firepower, and protection greater than 
the generally foot-mobile light forces, yet are less strategically and operationally 
cumbersome than the heavy armored and mechanized units. Therefore, the medium- 
weight brigade-size unit has been realized as just the right size to combine arms (armor, 
infantry, artillery, engineers) due to new technological advantages, which impose the 
brigade's lethality and survivability, while also overcoming the' deployability 
shortcomings of the U.S. Army divisions. 
The next point is that the U.S. Army, with strong support from the Congress and 
President G.W. Bush's administration, should take advantage of the current favorable 
conditions for success: 
xvi 
• Relatively peaceful world events; 
• Unrivaled economic prosperity; 
• Overwhelming technological progress. 
Overall, this thesis examines the idea that in order to become more deployable 
and maintain lethality, the U.S. Army has fielded a prototype medium-weight brigade- 
size force that will use off-the-shelf systems, and initiate the development of concepts, 
organizational design, and training for the future of the U.S. Army called "Objective 
Forces." Fortunately, the U.S. Army has time to deal with this issue. 
Analyzing the necessity of the Ukrainian Army's reformation, which also focuses 
on moving from the current large division-based structure to the medium-weight brigade- 
size Army, this thesis highlights several key elements from the two-year experience of 
the U.S. Army Transformation Strategy. This strategy should be studied and employed as 
a useful guide for reforming the Army of Ukraine. 
Despite some large economic and technological differences between the U.S. 
Army and the Army of Ukraine and the system of conscription, several points of the U.S. 
Army transformation strategy would be suitable for developing the Ukrainian rapid 
reaction forces based on a brigade-size force structure. First of these is a common 
strategy between the political and military leadership. Second, a multi-stage approach is 
necessary through the entire process of transforming. Third, some key elements from the 
organizational structure of the Initial Brigade Combat Team (EBCT), such as a Recon, 
Surveillance, and Target Acquisition Squadron (RSTA) will be advisable for Ukrainian 
medium-weight combined arms brigades. 
xvii 
Finally, special attention should be given to the IBCT's Operational Concept that 
has been crafted with the specific goal of performing military operations in urban terrain 
and combat capabilities  across the entire  spectrum of conflicts.  Above all,  two 
recommendations should be made, which will be effective for the further development of 
the Army of Ukraine: 
• First, the Ground Forces should have combat-ready formations and units 
at a level sufficient to fight a local war. The basic principle of battle 
actions of such an armed force is inflicting maximum damage to the 
opponent while receiving minimal losses for one's forces. In order to 
enhance the combat readiness and operational effectiveness of the troops, 
it is advisable, in manpower acquisition, to shift to the contract basis and 
to the modern, mobile, deployable combat structure of the Army based 
on medium-weight brigade-size units. 
• Second, headquarters and troops should be equally prepared for both local 
wars and large-scale wars. In personnel training, it is essential to give a 
higher priority to developing reconnaissance and intelligence gathering 
and terrain orientation skills, ensuring an effective use of all types of 
available weapon systems and enhancing survivability in combat. 
Furthermore, for Ukraine, the current and painful lack of funds should not simply 
break down the natural tendency of its Army to develop itself. Therefore, one of the 
lessons from the U.S. Army's experience is really crucial for successfully reforming the 
Army of Ukraine. This point is that the Ukrainian military must adjust its policy to 
xviii 
establish productive relationships with all branches of the state power, emphasizing 
public support as well as the support of legislative and executive powers. Hence, the 
critical point of reforming the Army of Ukraine in the light of democratic transformations 
is the issue of civilian control over the military and the relationship between political and 
military leaders. 
Similar to the U.S. Army, the Army of Ukraine is enjoying a period of peaceful 
world events in which it can transform itself into a new Army based on modern doctrine 
and force structure, where medium-weight brigades will be the key element, the 
"backbone" of the Ground Forces of Ukraine. As a matter of fact, the medium-weight 
brigade solution will allow the Army of Ukraine to begin the transformation process to a 
full spectrum force better able to deal with various types of military operations and to 
bring the Army of Ukraine to modem standards of Western armies where the U.S. Army 
plays the dominant role. Notably, the decision to move toward the medium-weight air- 
mobile concept would put the Army of Ukraine firmly on the path toward a more 
operationally agile force the of 21st century without calling for either technological or 
budgetary magic. 
xix 
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I.       INTRODUCTION 
The art of war is of vital importance to the state. It is a matter of life and death, 
hence it is a subject of enquiry, which can on no account be neglected. 
~ Sun Tzu. 
Warfare occupies a special place in the chain of the most important, momentous 
events in the world. It was estimated that during five and a half millennia on earth there 
were approximately 15,000 wars and armed conflicts in which more than 3.5 billion 
people died. Throughout human history, people have lived in peace for only 292 years, 
for less than one week for every 100 years. Additionally, in the past 50 years, nearly 260 
local wars and armed conflicts broke out.2 Even worst, the 20th century has been marked 
by two devastating world wars. The tragic paradox of our modern history is that the 
evolution of human civilization could not preclude war as a means of resolving inter- 
state, religious, ethnic, or class conflicts. And although the world community has so far 
managed to prevent World War III, as well as the "War with the Third World," resolving 
conflicts through the use of armed force remains a distinguishing feature of our era. 
History teaches us that while peaceful times should be cherished, peace is not a 
permanent condition in world affairs.3 Unfortunately, recent events suggest that the time 
and opportunity to prepare for future conflicts may not be as long as many had hoped five 
1
 Sun Tzu, The Art Of War, Translated by Lionel Giles, The Department of Oriental Printed Books and 
MSS. in the British Museum, First Published in 1910, http://www.kimsoft.com/polwar.htm 
2
 V. Vakhrushev, "Local Wars and Armed Conflicts: Impact on the Military Art," Military Thought, 01.08. 
1999, MTR-No.004, http://news.mosinfo.ru/news/mth/ 
3
 Douglas A. Macgregor, Breaking Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21s' Century, The Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, 1997, p.6. 
years ago. Even small nations can no longer be prevented from building a total war 
capacity—whether nuclear or conventional.4 
As a matter of fact, in the century that has seen the bloodiest conflicts in human 
history, there are signs that the basic nature of war is changing. Warfare's traditional 
associations with nationalism and patriotism are melting away, and the small wars of the 
21st century, fought by mixed bands of looters, ideologues and mercenaries in the service 
of shadowy masters, have appeared from the history of the Middle Ages. Such warfare by 
irregular armies is now more the rule than the exception, notes military historian Martin 
van Creveld, "In today's world, the main threat to many states ... no longer comes from 
other states. Instead, it comes from small groups and other organizations which are not 
states."5 
The main purpose of my thesis is to examine the history of reorganizing the U.S. 
Army by focusing on the most recent changes in the U.S. Army, specifically the decision 
to transform itself into a "medium-weight brigade-size" force structure, which is capable 
of operating across the full spectrum of military tasks. My second purpose is to reach 
some conclusions about how one can apply this brigade-size force structure to the current 
process of developing the Ukrainian Army. The critical question to be answered is: 
• How does the military reform relate to the external dimensions of the 
strategic environment as well as to the internal policy in the case of 
reforming the U.S. Army and the Army of Ukraine? 
Jeff Erlich and Theresa Hitchens, "Counterprolifiration Efforts Await Requirement Review," Defense 
News, 11.6-12.1995, p.6. 
M.E. Ahrari, "The Future Face of Battle Civilization," Civilization, 04.01.97, http://www.britannica.com 
Moreover, I will consider the challenges of reforming the U.S. Army and the 
Army of Ukraine in the recent changes in the strategic environment. Additionally, I will 
analyze the degree to which the U.S. Army's participation in the Gulf War (1990—1991) 
and in the peacekeeping/peacemaking (1990—2001) operations created a "New Vision" 
of the U.S Army. Finally, I will discuss the driving forces and trends developing of the 
Ukrainian Army in the post-Soviet era. 
Considering the worldwide process of reforming an army's structure, many 
nations, based on their previous experience, are attempting to make their armies more 
rapidly deployable, lethal, survivable, self-sustainable, and all this within budget 
constrains. In fact, with the increasingly high-tech nature of combat, small, versatile, 
well-equipped forces have the advantage over cumbersome conventional armies. New 
technologies make it possible even for small groups of perpetrators to inflict ever more 
chaos and danger for nations around the world. In the face of this new threat, the world's 
most advanced armed forces are almost completely useless and have almost always lost. 
That is because their weapons and intelligence systems are designed to combat numerous, 
well-organized foes.6 
With this in mind, the most dangerous future foes for the U.S, its allies and other 
countries called "newly-emerging democracies" will be terrorist operatives and guerrilla 
fighters rather than regular full-prepared and equipped national armies. However, military 
planners are still headed for a rude awakening if they continue to design super-powerful 
weapons for waging super-sophisticated wars against super-sophisticated opponents who 
6
 A National Security Strategy for a New Century, The White House, Washington D.C., 12.1999, 
http://www.fas.org/man/docs/nssrpref-1299.htm 
are nowhere in sight. Instead, they should be preparing for a new sort of approaching 
.7 war. 
The necessity of reorganizing of the U.S. Army as one of the components of the 
Ground Forces of the United States has appeared because of global changes in the 
arrangement of power, which has taken place worldwide during the last few decades. 
Since the end of the Cold War, the Department of Defense of the United States has 
undergone several reviews of its programs, policies, weapons and missions. In fact, the 
post-Cold War military strategy was designed to fight, nearly simultaneously, two major 
regional wars while remaining able to cope with smaller military emergencies. Therefore, 
those reviews determined that the military should continue to look as it always had, 
although somewhat smaller.8 However, the missions of the American military have 
changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. Peacekeeping and humanitarian 
missions (where the U.S. Army's ability to conduct lengthy and broad-scale operations 
through generously manned land forces is unnecessary) have now become the norm. The 
spectrum of operations runs from Stability and Support Operations (SASO) at the bottom 
through Small Scale Contingencies (SSC) up to Major Theater War (MTW). The U.S. 
Army has trained and ready forces to fight a MTW. What was found in the SSC 
operations is that because the U.S. Army does not have forces optimized for these 
scenarios it has to put an ad hoc force together under time constraints.9 
Hans A. Binnendijk and Patrick Clawson, The Strategic Assessment 1997, Flashpoints and Force 
Structure, Washington D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/sa98/sa98cont.html 
Amy Mcauliffe, Technology: Changing the Way the Army Does Business, Military & Aerospace 
Electronics, 02.1996, p.24. 
9
 Gen. Eric K. Shinseki Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, "The Army Transformation: A Historic Opportunity^ 
Army Magazine, http://www.ausa.org/armvzine/shinseki sr OO.html 
The U.S. Army's requirement therefore has appeared to be more strategically 
responsive and capable of meeting the SSC's needs without compromising its MTW's 
capability. Also, the necessity of reorganizing the U.S. Army has come into view because 
of the rapid development of military technologies. The explanation of this technologic 
development can be represented as follows: 
• Lethality and the range of modem arms will increase rapidly; 
• The intended capability to pass, accumulate and process greater 
amounts of changing data as well as to establish and maintain 
communications at tremendous distances. 
• At the same time, the necessity for increasing the maneuverability 
and mobility of combat units in addition to increased combat 
requirements at the strategic and operational levels of control. 
Tracing the evolution of the divisional structure of the U.S. Army, we will see 
that the overall strength of American divisions has changed constantly. For instance, 
during World War II American divisions of three brigades were composed of three 
regiments each. In fact, this structure was more maneuverable and simple to control. 
Nevertheless, even that division did not have all the needed units for conducting full- 
scale operations and, as a role, was strengthened by additional tank, anti-tank, 
reconnaissance battalions and anti-aircraft batteries. 
During the Korean War (1950-1953), the overall strength of a reinforced division 
reached the point of 13,500 personnel. That division consisted of three regiment-size 
10
 Sergey Onishyk, "America Moves toward the Brigade Army: The Transformation of the Ground Forces 
of the U.S. is Real; However Some Deficiencies Exist," Nezavisimay Gaseta, No 28 (201), 08.04.2000, 
http://www.ng.ru.file://C:temp\l brigada.html.html 
operational groups. Each of them included a tank battalion, an artillery battalion, an 
engineer company, a reconnaissance company and supporting units.11 
An American PENTOMIC division in the 1960s was intended for combat 
operations under the conditions of using weapons of mass destruction. As a result, this 
division (8,600 personnel) was divided into five battle groups.12 However, it became 
obvious that for conducting combat operations with conventional weapons this division 
structure was inadequate. In 1961, the U.S. Army dropped the PENTANA organization in 
favor of the concept titled, "Reorganization Objective Army Divisions" (ROAD). 
The ROAD division (about 13,512 personnel) consisted of brigade task forces that 
were supposed to be flexible enough to fight in any environment, nuclear or non-nuclear, 
and to have a plausible chance of defending Western Europe without resort to tactical 
nuclear weapons.13 
In 1978, the Department of the U.S. Army launched an initiative called "Division 
86" and in July 1979, formally adopted this concept. Even though the Division 86's 
concept seemed similar to the ROAD division, the heavy division totaled about 20,000 
personnel, a significant increase from the original ROAD design.14 In fact, this structure 
has not yet been canceled; however, administrative limitations along with conservative 
tactic of conducting combat operations engaging a huge number of supporting and 
auxiliary units, plus a complicated system of rear support services still decrease a 
1
' William W. Epley, America 's First Cold War Army 1945-1950, The Institute of Land Warfare Papers, 
Association of the United States Army, The Land Warfare Papers, No.15, 1993, pp.19-23. 
12
 Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-1976, Fr. Leavenworth, Kansas: 
Combat Studies Institute, 1979. pp.17-19. 
13
 David W. Hogan, Jr., 225 Years of Service: The U.S. Army, 1775-2000, Center of Military History 
United States Army, Washington D.C., 2000, p.29. 
John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to Air-Land Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973- 
1982, Fr Monroe: Historical Office, TRADCOM, 06.1984, pp.40-42. 
division's mobility and flexibility. As a result, the above-mentioned arguments should be 
considered major reasons why the leadership of the U.S. Army, with the strong support of 
the Congress and the new Administration of President Bush, has considered the 
possibility of making fundamental structural changes under the "New Vision," a plan to 
transform the U.S. Army. In this plan, "medium-weight brigade-size" combat units will 
be the key elements of the U.S. Army. Indeed, huge "arms-heavy division-based" units 
have become cumbersome for transient battles of the 21st century. The U.S. Army intends 
immediately to develop a force that is deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, 
sustainable and dominant at every point along the spectrum of operations. The vision 
statement establishes a goal to deploy a combat capable brigade anywhere in the world 
within 96 hours after liftoff, a warfighting division on the ground in 120 hours, and five 
divisions within thirty days.15 "We know that we can move heavy brigades, and we have 
done it, in 96 hours. But that takes a significant amount of pre-deployment planning and 
rehearsal. What we are after here is the capability to put that combat-capable brigade 
anywhere in the world in 96 hours" stated the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General 
Shinseki.16 
As a matter of fact, the U.S. Army's decision to reorganize, and to transform itself 
into an Army with new combat capabilities is not a singular example, for it is happening 
around the world. Even a quick survey of the Army of Canada, Germany and Ukraine 
will give the same vision of the process of the force transformation. 
15
 Press Conference Secretary of the Army, Louis Caldera and Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric K. 
Shinseki, Association of the United States Army, Washington D.C., 10.12.1999, 
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/army/unit/docs/rl 9991014ausapress.htm 
16
 Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General Eric K. Shinseki, "The Army Transformation: A Historic 
Opportunity," Army Magazine, http://www.ausa.org/armv2ine/shinseki sr OO.html 
In case of Canada, the Land Forces of Canada, with 19,000 regular personnel 
organized into three mechanized brigade groups is also not structured for quick 
deployment to trouble spots, such as Bosnia, and Kosovo. As a result, the military's 
recent Defense Planning Guidance (DPG 2000) directs the Chief of the Land Staff to 
"complete the development of the Army of Tomorrow and implement a plan to start its 
transformation."17 DPG 2000 mandates that the Army must produce a plan for a Land 
Force structure that will be more readily deployable. The Army has responded by 
initiating the Army Transformation project, which will produce a blueprint for the next 
five to ten years—the Army of Tomorrow. In short, the planning guidance for the project 
says the Army is to be a multi-purpose, combat-capable force, optimized for 
expeditionary operations. It will be modular in composition, in order to facilitate the 
effective integration of diverse capabilities for the widest number of employment 
scenarios, which means that the Army's combat capability will be anchored on medium- 
weight forces able to integrate with both lighter and heavier coalitions forces. As a result, 
capability redundancy will be reduced.18 Furthermore, across the Atlantic, we also see 
attempts to adopt a similar strategy of reforming the armed forces regardless if they 
belong to developed democratic nations, such as Germany or to a newly emerging 
democracy, such as Ukraine. 
A quick review of the process inside the Bundeswehr reveals that Germany's 
Army is on the same path as its NATO's allies. In fact, the conflict between security- 
related responsibilities and financial constraints constitute the framework for the 
Bundeswehr planning. Since October 1990, the all-German armed forces have been 
17
 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG 2000), Chapter 2: "Strategic Direction," http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/ 
18
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reduced from their overall strength of around 600,000 to an interim ceiling of 370,000. 
In July 1994, the German government fixed the future peacetime strength of the armed 
forces at 340,000; their wartime strength will amount to approximately 680,000.19 The 
changes in the political and strategic environment require a change in force structure. 
Different categories of forces have been established: 
• The mobilization-dependent Main Defense Forces continue to be 
the backbone of national and Alliance defense. 
• The readily operational Reaction Forces—approximately 50,000 
strong—constitute, first of all, the active component of national 
defense designed to protect the mobilization and deployment of the 
Main Defense Forces.20 
The cornerstone of the organizational structure of the Army is the corps, which 
will exercise control over the operational divisions, which are composed of two or three 
brigades.21 In sum, with its forces, the German Army will be able to be employed in tasks 
across the entire spectrum of military operations. 
Speaking about Ukraine, it is necessary to point out that on May 29, 2000, the 
National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, jointly with the President, adopted a 
revised program for developing the armed forces, covering the period to 2005. The key 
objective of the new program is to have a battle worthy, modern, deployable, affordable 
army of optimal size.22 Ukraine's Defense Minister and General of the Army Oleksandr 
Kuzmuk, detailing new plans for the Armed Forces in Kiev on May 31, 2000, stated that 
these transformations are closely connected with structural changes. In 
particular, excess command units will be removed, and various types of the land forces 
German Security Policy and the Bundeswehr, http://bundeswehr.de/index .html 
Ibid., http://btindeswehr.de/index .html 
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brigades will replace five mechanized divisions, which should make them more 
deployable and less costly.23 
The current state of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the potentially evolving 
situation on its borders will show that in order to conduct successful operations in local 
armed conflicts in the foreseeable future, the Ukrainian Army will need to create 
independent operational groups of forces. Theses forces will be comprised of different 
combined armed units under time constraints from several territorial commands, where 
these ground forces' units will play a key role. Therefore, the ground forces should have 
combat-ready formations at a level sufficient to conduct a limited armed conflict. 
The basic principle of waging battles is inflicting the maximum damage to the enemy 
with the minimal losses to one's own army. In order to enhance the combat readiness and 
operational effectiveness of the troops, it is necessary to shift to the modern, mobile, 
deployable combat structure of the Ukrainian Army based on medium-weight brigade- 
size units. 
The Ukrainian Army is also in the process of transformation. Ukraine's defense 
priorities are focused on moving from the current large division-based structure to the 
medium-weight brigade-size Army, thereby reforming it to modem standards. Hence, the 
two-years experience, which the U.S. Army has received while transforming its structure, 
can serve as an example for the Ukrainian Army's reformation plan. In this case, there 
should be heavy emphasis on research, model-building and theory. Equally important is 
that Ukraine cannot ignore the practical realities of maintaining combat readiness, and 
trained forces with almost no funding and with deteriorating equipment. 
23
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Indeed, the current geostrategic environment along with internal security needs 
require the Ukrainian Army to have five or six medium-weight efficient and effective 
combat brigades "on battlefield" instead of five or six cumbersome divisions "on paper." 
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II.      BACKGROUND OF THE U.S. ARMY REORGANIZATION 
Every age has its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, 
and its own peculiar preconceptions.' 
~ Carl Von Clausewitz 
A.       EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. ARMY DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE 
This chapter traces the development of the U.S. Army doctrine during the crucial 
period between the Korean War (1950—1953) through the Atomic Age (1953—1965) 
and the beginnings of the Air-Land Battle doctrine (1973) in the aftermath of the Vietnam 
War. Indeed, related to the issue of reforming the U.S. Army is the recurrent theme of 
"doctrine," which: 
....is supposed to be a clear set of guidelines for prewar 
preparations and wartime operations; but, in fact, doctrine is so 
often in flux or dispute that we must accept the condition as a 
normal.... Doctrine, whatever explicit or implicit, is never absent; 
defined simply, it is the general consensus among military leaders 
on how to wage war.... Doctrine may entail a kind of commitment 
that closes minds to alternative possibilities, and that failure or 
difficulties in applying doctrine may do less to change the doctrine 
than to strengthen the commitment; stubbornness and moral 
courage are qualities more easily distinguished from one another 
on paper than on the battlefield.25 
As a matter of fact, there is a natural tendency to assume that only the most recent 
military experience is relevant because so much has been altered by these deep, long-term 
changes.26 Additionally, it will have become obvious that national security policy, new 
technology, service, and actual battlefield experience have interacted to determine the 
U.S. Army doctrine, and that doctrine reflects a compromise between national security 
24
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25
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policy and realities. However, "the great value of doctrine is less the final answers it 
provides, than the impetus it creates toward developing innovative and creative solutions 
for tactical problems on the battlefield."27 
Indeed, several points from the history of the U.S. Army, which certainly have 
had a strong influence on the strategy of transformation, requires emphasis: 
• Firepower over maneuver in the doctrine of the 1940s and the 
Korean War: 
The experiments with the PENT ANA Army during the 1950s; 
The advent of the Reorganization Objectives Army Division 
(ROAD), air-mobility, and the counterinsurgency of the 1960s; 
• The stress on small unit operations during the Vietnam era; and the 
return to an emphasis on big-unit warfare in Europe during the 
early 1970s. 
• The attempt of the joint warfare during the Desert Storm in 1991 
under the Army's structure called the "Army of Excellence." 
• The recent combat experience gained in the Balkan conflicts in 
1993—1999. 
Nevertheless, before reaching any conclusions about developing the U.S. Army's 
doctrine, one must keep in mind that, ".. .natural tendency is to read history backward, to 
look for the present in the past, neglecting all that for the moment does not seem relevant. 
But reading history backward destroyed the integrity of the past."28 
As a matter of fact, the U.S. Army has undergone at least five major 
reorganizations since the end of World War II. First was the immediate post-World War 
II force. This was the Army that fought the Korean War. Organizationally, doctrinally, 
and in its equipment, this force was almost identical to the World War II U.S. Army. 
27
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In fact, between World War II and the outbreak of the Korean War, in accordance with 
President Truman's policy, which directed a two-year demobilization that reduced the 
U.S. Army from 90 to 10 divisions, budgetary limits reduced the size of ground forces to 
the point that they became "hollow divisions, lacking the personnel, equipment and 
training required for full combat effectiveness."29 For fiscal 1948, the military submitted 
a budget of $22 billion; however, Truman pared that down and sent a defense-spending 
budget to Congress of $11 billion.30 By 1950, the National Security Council concluded 
that the demobilization had gone too far. The U.S. Army expanded to 20 divisions by 
1953 during the Korean War, reflecting America's concern with the defense of Western 
Europe. The armored division retained its current organization with three combat 
commands, but was reduced by 2,700 personnel to about 12,000. The new infantry 
division also had three combat commands. The division would have about 13,500 
personnel, a reduction of almost 4,000.31 In short, the U.S. Army of the 1950s owed 
much to the World War II model and was a large conscript force whose divisions were 
modeled on the armored division of World War II and whose fundamental tactics were 
based on massive application of firepower and armored shock tactics. The most important 
innovation for high intensity ground war was the creation of the mechanized infantry 
29
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division with each infantry battalion equipped with organic armored carriers.32 However, 
the expansion of the U.S. Army was not long-lasting. 
By 1952, when Eisenhower was elected president, the national security state was 
a permanent feature of American politics and life. The new president's reliance on air- 
atomic power and not conventional forces "turned the emphasis on nuclear deterrence 
into formal doctrine."33 President Eisenhower believed economic growth was the key to 
the United States' future national security. His "New Look" strategy made massive 
retaliation with atomic and thermonuclear weapons the centerpiece of America's defense 
posture. As a result, reliance on atomic weapons to deter conflict allowed for reduced 
spending on more expensive conventional forces.34 In that new strategy, the U.S. Army 
was a prime target for reduction. From 1953 to 1957 the Army's budget fell from $15 
billion to $7.5 billion. Manpower decreased from 1.5 million to 998,000 and there was a 
plan to reduce to 14 active divisions by 1960. Above all, by the middle of 1954, the U.S. 
Army submitted proposal to fight on atomic battlefields.35 
The second major reorganization; however, regarded as a failure, was the mid- 
1950s PENT ANA Army that was an attempt to organize the Ground Force for nuclear 
combat. This project was called "Doctrinal and Organizational Concepts for an Atomic- 
Non- Atomic Army during the period 1960-1970," nicknamed the PENT ANA Army.36 
32
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In the aftermath of the Korean War, facing a tense bipolar world 
living under the shadow of nuclear destruction, the Army under the 
administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower sought an 
organization and doctrines that would support the nation's policy 
of containing communism over the "long haul" without wasting 
American resources or bankrupting the American economy. The 
Army especially needed to develop a credible deterrent in Western 
Europe, where it faced the prospect of being overwhelmed by the 
numerically superior Soviet Army. To meet this challenge, it 
turned to tactical nuclear weapons that it hoped could repel an 
attack by the Warsaw Pact without touching off a general nuclear 
exchange. It also adjusted its organization to fight a tactical nuclear 
war, adopting atomic artillery and a new divisional organization, 
the so-called PENTOMIC division, which used self-contained 
battle groups that could supposedly fight under the confused 
conditions of a nuclear battlefield with only minimal direction 
from higher headquarters. The new organization was in line with 
the Eisenhower administration's desire for a military force that 
could provide "bigger bang" for a buck.37 
To be more specific, in the late 1950s, the U.S. Army reorganized each infantry 
division into a "PENTOMIC division" concept of five infantry battle groups; however, 
without organic armored mobility and protection for tactical nuclear war in Europe, this 
made little operational sense in the context of a battle fought primarily with nuclear 
weapons. These groups were, in effect, large battalions. Each battle group had five rifle 
companies, a combat support company, and appropriate field artillery and service 
support. The battle groups were self-sustaining, could be employed separately or in 
■jo 
combinations, and remained largely unchanged during the 1950s. 
Even as the Army began to overlay the PENTOMIC design over the divisions, 
there were concerns and criticisms about that structure, such as battle groups were not 
large enough to conduct a sustained attack or an aggressive defense. At the same time, 
37
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eliminating of the battalion structure decreased flexibility; the battle group could not 
control and tactically deploy subordinate companies efficiently.39 Furthermore, the 
PENTANA design justified demands for additional resources. The PENTANA Army's 
strategy called for developing new weapons and equipment, as well as increasing 
manpower. Meanwhile, in December 1955, PENTANA foresaw a universal, air 
transportable division of 8,600 men to replace existing divisions. The only problem was 
the Army did not have the money or the technology to implement that concept.40 
After that, the PENTOMIC division structure was abandoned in the early 1960s 
when the U.S Army adopted for all divisions the combat command organization of the 
armored division. Combat commands were renamed brigades. Each division had three 
brigade headquarters into which various numbers of battalions could be joined together. 
All divisions were similarly organized. Some were heavy (armored or mechanized) and 
some were light (infantry and airborne), depending on the mission and types of battalions 
assigned, which were the principal differences between divisions.41 
In January 1959, General Bruce C. Clarke, the Commanding General of 
CONARC (Continental Army Command), directed a new study titled, "Modern Mobile 
Army 1965-70 (MOMAR I)" to provide an objective for modernizing the U.S. Army to 
be capable of fighting nuclear or conventional wars anywhere in the world against a 
variety of foes.42 The new design included several essential concepts. MOMAR I 
eliminated the corps echelon and had the field army directly control the divisions. The 
design emphasized mechanization. There would be only two types of divisions, heavy 
39Ibid.,pp.l7-19. 
40
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and medium, with all units completely mounted in organic vehicles. To provide rapid 
response forces, the concept also envisioned using air transportable brigades instead of 
airborne divisions. The MOMAR I divisions had five self-sustained combat commands, 
which were a hybrid of the regiments and combat commands of World War II. However, 
the MOMAR I design was never tested.43 
The search for more flexible conventional capability continued to propel the need 
for a new division design. Major changes in America's strategic approaches added force 
to this effort; therefore the U.S. military strategy had shifted from massive retaliation to 
flexible response. President John F. Kennedy having "personal interest in guerilla 
warfare"44 believed that the most likely future military confrontations would be in limited 
wars that did not bring the superpowers into direct conflict. The military needed to be 
able to respond "flexibly" to these threats. 
In 1961, after the point when the new administration of President John F. 
Kennedy adopted the strategy of "flexible response" under which the United States would 
respond to the different forms of threat and aggression across the spectrum of conflict, 
ranging from nuclear exchanges through conventional warfare, to low-key assistance to 
countries fighting "wars of national liberation" sponsored by the former Soviet Union and 
its allies. The U.S. Army dropped the PENTANA organization in favor of the concept 
titled Reorganization Objective Army Divisions (ROAD). The ROAD division consisted 
of brigade task forces that were supposed to be flexible enough to fight in any 
environment, nuclear or non-nuclear, and to have a plausible chance of defending 
43Ibid.,p.20-21. 
44
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Western Europe without resort to tactical nuclear weapons.45 Initially, the ROAD focused 
only on reorganizing the infantry and armored divisions and creating a mechanized 
division of about 13,512 personnel for each. Eliminating the PENTOMIC battle groups, 
the new divisions looked like a modern fusion of the World War II designs. The new 
structures incorporated a common division base with a division headquarters, combat 
support assets and a divisional logistical support command. The predominant type of 
combat maneuver battalions added to the base determined the type of division. The 
ROAD division's three maneuver brigades reflected the influence of the old armored 
division combat commands. The brigades did not have any assigned units. Planners 
intended for the brigades to serve as tactical headquarters, each capable of controlling the 
operations of two to five maneuver battalions. Brigade commanders could "task 
organize" the battalions to create combined arms task forces.46 Overall, one of the major 
changes under the ROAD concept was creating the mechanized infantry units of division, 
brigade and battalion size. What is more, the ROAD division reorganization put the 
Army firmly back on the track of making cumulative improvements on previous combat- 
tested designs.47 
Beginning in 1972 the Army tested another variation of the ROAD design termed 
the, "Concept Triple Capability" (TRICAP) mixing the capabilities of the armor, 
airmobile and air cavalry units employed in Vietnam. The experimental force, totaling 
fewer than 14,000 personnel, consisted of armored, airmobile and air cavalry combat 
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brigades. In 1974, the Army reorganized the division again, making it a standard armored 
division and the air cavalry combat brigade became a separate formation in 1975. 
The third major reorganization came with the Vietnam-era force. In the mid- 
1970s, a number of strategic factors such as the 1973 Yom Kippur War between the 
Arabs and Israelis that demonstrated the vastly increased lethality of modem 
conventional weapons,49 forced the U.S. Army to review the division design once again 
and had cost the U.S. Army a generation of weapons modernization, which should have 
demonstrated the vastly increased lethality of modern conventional weapons. 
As a matter of fact, 
The Vietnam War also raised serious questions about flexible 
response and limited war, the raison d'etre for the Army since the 
Korean War. For the rest of the decade and into the 1980s, the 
Army focused on rebuilding its forces and adjusting doctrine for 
conventional war, especially the defense of Western Europe 
against a possible attack by Warsaw Pact forces. The Army 
strengthened its NATO forces with new technology and a new 
doctrine that emphasized maneuver, mobility, and air support. 
At the same time, the service continued its battle at a lower level 
against Marxist regimes and movements in the Third World. 
In 1975, when the Vietnam War ended, the Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC) found the current Army division designs inadequate to meet the Warsaw Pact 
threat.52 As a result, divisions would continue to have three brigades but each brigade 
would be substantially larger, with a mix of tank and mechanized infantry battalions 
48
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supplemented by antitank guided missile companies. The division would also have more 
organic aviation support. Though calling for larger brigades overall, the division actually 
had less ground-defense capability strength with smaller infantry squads and fewer tanks 
per platoon; however, those decreases would be compensated by more lethal weapons.53 
Above all, shifts in national military strategy prompted an expanded redesign effort. In 
conjunction with NATO, the United States had implemented a conventional force buildup 
to match the Warsaw Pact. To meet this objective, the U.S. Army indeed needed new 
weapons, an updated doctrine, and new organizations. Following the geo-strategic defeat 
in Vietnam, the U.S. Army slowly moved into the existing concept called the "Army of 
Excellence." 
In 1978, the Department of the U.S. Army launched an initiative called "Division 
86" and in July 1979, formally adopted this concept. Even though the Division 86 's 
concept appeared similar to the ROAD division, the heavy division totaled about 20,000 
personnel that significantly increased from the original ROAD design.54 In fact, the 
Division 86 concept was designed to have flexibility, mobility and heavy combat power 
to withstand the echeloned attack of the Warsaw Pact armies. The logic behind the new 
design was to fight and win on a conventional, high-intensity battlefield in Western 
Europe without relying on tactical nuclear weapons. The key idea was to prevent 
the Warsaw Pact with their tremendous combat power from rolling over NATO's 
forward-ground defenses. Moreover, the U.S. Army had to be able to conduct worldwide 
contingency operations as well as deploy rapidly to reinforce forward NATO forces. 
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55 To do this, the division would need increased mobility, flexibility and firepower. 
Overall, in the 1980s the U.S. Army was straining to meet global commitments outlined 
by the national military strategy. The U.S. national strategy suggested a need for the less 
than 11,000 personnel infantry division, the division to operate in a low intensity setting 
for 48 hours without external support.56 Despite increases in defense funding at the end of 
President Carter's and the beginning of President Reagan's terms, the U.S. Army was in a 
tough situation because it had more missions than forces. What was worse, the Division- 
en . 
86 concept was unaffordable both in terms of manpower and resources. During the 
1980s, the U.S. Army fielded a motorized division and several light infantry divisions. 
The motorized division could rapidly deploy to a contingency area and defeat enemy 
forces ranging from light infantry to tank and motorized forces. Light divisions provided 
58 
versatility and strategic flexibility through their capability for rapid deployment. 
It is worth pointing out that during the 1980s, the air combat brigade concept 
became institutionalized while the motorized concept died during the late 1980s due to a 
lack of investment in a light-armored vehicle family and antagonism from both the 
Armor and Infantry branches of the Army. The light infantry division concept became the 
Army's model for air transportable units. Structurally, today's Army is quite similar to 
the force at the end of the Vietnam period a mix of very light and very heavy units. 
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Currently, this concept does not call for any major change in the organization or the 
concept of operations for either the light or heavy combat formations.59 
In sum, the U.S. Army has generally been configured into either very heavy 
armored and mechanized units armed with large numbers of heavy fully-tracked vehicles 
or very light infantry-type units that are primarily foot mobile. Of course, both types of 
forces include a wide variety of sub-units, artillery, aviation, and all kinds of support 
organizations. Today, the 10-division U.S. Army of 1998 has six heavy armored or 
mechanized divisions on one end of the spectrum and three air transportable or light 
divisions on the other end. The single airmobile division lies somewhat in the middle. 
While the 101st airborne division is not encumbered with large numbers of armored 
vehicles, it is nevertheless logistically equivalent to a heavy division and difficult to 
move strategically. 
The U.S. Army's current warfighting doctrine reflects the nature of modern 
warfare. It is essentially a joint doctrine, recognizing the teamwork required of all the 
services. The U.S. Army divisions conduct Army operations both in war and other than 
war arenas. All divisions are generally organized with a similar basic design. This design 
comprises a division headquarters and headquarters company, three ground maneuver 
brigades, an aviation brigade, a artillery battalion, a support command, a cavalry 
squadron, an air defense artillery battalion, an engineer battalion or brigade, a signal 
Prepare the Army for War, TRADOC 1973-1998, Chapter IV, "Force Design," 
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battalion, a military intelligence battalion, a military police company, and, in most cases, 
a chemical company.60 
The early 1990s brought significant changes to the world and to the U.S. Army. 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the apparent end of the Cold War presented 
threats that were more ambiguous and regionally focused. In fact, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and federal budget deficits generated a demand for rapid force reductions. 
While forces shrank, the United States did not plan to retreat from its global 
responsibilities. The national military strategy called for a combination of strategic 
deterrence, forward deployed forces and the ability to respond to regional crisis. At the 
same time, the strategy established exacting standards for the employment of military 
forces. Forces would only be employed where clear-cut objectives had been established. 
When military power was used, it would be applied with overwhelming force to ensure 
quick and decisive victory with minimum casualties. 
B.        THE GULF WAR AND ARMED CONFLICTS IN THE BALKANS 
On February 24, 1991, after more than 180 days of maritime interception 
operations and 41 days of bombing, the U.S. "Army of Excellence" entered its test of 
battle during Operation Desert Storm. The ground offensive's objectives were to eject the 
Iraqi Armed Forces from Kuwait, to destroy the Republican Guard in the Kuwait Theater 
of Operations (KTO), and to help restore the legitimate government of Kuwait. When the 
plan of the Operation Desert Storm was issued, it directed that the ground part of the 
theater campaign be conducted in four phases: 
60
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• Phase I - Logistical buildup, estimated as "a huge build-up;"62 
• Phase II - Force repositioning; 
• Phase III - Ground attack; 
• Phase IV - Tactical consolidation.63 
In order to put this plan into operation, the Coalition Ground Forces formed three 
separate groups for Operation Desert Storm: 
• First was the XVIII Airborne Corps, composed of the 82nd Airborne, the 
101st Air Assault, and the 24th Mechanized Infantry. In addition, the 3rd 
Armored Cavalry Regiment and French forces were attached to this 
command. 
• Marines composed the second force. The 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions 
were combined in the northeastern part of Saudi Arabia. The 1st was 
composed of the l,st 4,th and 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigades and the 2nd 
comprised the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade. 
• The main attack force was the VII Corps, relocated from Europe. The VII 
was composed of the 1st and 2nd U.S. Armored Divisions, the 1st 
Mechanized Infantry Division and the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment.64 
In short, the plan envisioned a supporting attack along the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia 
border by the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and Arab Coalition forces to hold most 
forward Iraqi divisions in place. Simultaneously, two U.S. Army corps (VII and XVIII), 
enlarged with French and United Kingdom divisions would strike deep into Iraq 
defenses, cut Iraqi lines of communication and destroy the Republican Guards forces in 
the KTO.65 
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For this time, the U.S. Army had been exploring some new force design initiatives 
in a project called "Air-Land Battle," where future modifications to the division designs 
would be perfected and closely tied to the evolution of the U.S. Army's operational 
doctrine. 
The doctrinal debate ended with the publication of a new edition of 
FM 100-5 in 1982 that clearly reflected a change in American 
military thinking from an attrition paradigm to one of maneuver. 
The sea change in U.S military thinking resulted in the emergence 
of the concept of the Air-Land Battle. More importantly and 
perhaps more germane to the discussion is that the 1982 manual 
witnessed the beginning in Western operational thinking of a 
myopic focus on heavy force war in Europe based upon the 
conceptual model of The Deep Strike and Blitzkrieg. Clearly, the 
Air-Land Battle was the genesis and enduring principle of the U.S. 
Army's new doctrine.66 
As the strategic environment began to change in 1991 and the focus of the 
strategic threat moved from a single continental look to a global outlook, operational 
theory in the U.S Army remained rooted in an industrial age paradigm. However, this fact 
did not deny that from 1973 to 1990 the Air-Land Battle concept was probably the most 
innovative element of the military art of 20th century. Indeed the success in the Gulf War 
of 1990-1991 was an acknowledgement of the effectiveness of the Air-Land Battle 
theory. Moreover, the foundation of Operation Desert Storm was laid in the immediate 
aftermath of Vietnam that played an essential role in forming key decisions related to 
conducting the war. Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who shifted the 
United States from threat-based planning to capabilities-based planning, remembers: 
Vietnam is running through my mind very much. For those of us 
who are Vietnam veterans and rose to positions of leadership in the 
American armed forces later, and we all have a view that says, "If 
you are going to put us into something, then you owe the armed 
66
 W. Semiamaw, Western Operational Theory: Breaking the Industrial Paradigm, "The Nature of Western 
Operational Theory, War, Peace and Security," http://wwwxfcsc.fed.ca/irc/amsc/amscl/037.html#nll2 
27 
forces, ....you owe a clear statement of what political objective 
you are trying to achieve and then you put the force to that 
objective and you know when you have accomplished it.67 
In fact, the U.S. doctrine, strategy, and tactics, developed originally in response to 
the Soviet threat to Western Europe, stressed maneuver warfare based on continuous 
operations, agility, and flexibility—attributes that served commanders well as they 
planned and executed the ground operation against Iraq. Without a doubt, years of 
cooperation and combined operations with in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) smoothed integration of European allies into the operation Desert Storm. 
Service doctrine for land warfare worked. Army Air-Land Battle 
and USMC maneuver warfare doctrine were compatible and set the 
example for Coalition ground operations.68 
As has been mentioned before, developments within the U.S. Army were set in 
the context of the U.S.—USSR conflict and focused on combat operations in central 
Europe against the massive, armor-heavy Warsaw Pact's threat. Programs begun in the 
mid-1970s reorganized the armed services on a volunteer basis, began to revise doctrine 
based on maneuver warfare, and formulated a long-range modernization effort. The 
systematic evolution of doctrine before Operation Desert Storm that stressed maneuver 
warfare fundamentals, coupled with a joint doctrine for air, land, and maritime operations 
under a unified commander were significant advantages for the Gulf War. These and 
other steps combined to create the most capable land force in the U.S. history. 
However, it is necessary to keep in mind that when the Gulf crisis took place in 
August 1990, the United States was fortunate to be confronted by an enemy who yielded 
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the strategic initiative once its initial objectives were seized. This afforded the U.S.-led 
coalition the time (nearly five months) that was needed to deploy by sea the heavy forces 
that would eventually lead the counter-offensive to retake Kuwait. For example, the 
decision to bring the 7th Corps of the U.S. Army from Europe was not made until October 
1990. This chronology of the Operation Desert Storm shows some difficulties in the 
timeline of the 7th Corps's deploying: 
• .     August 2,1990: Iraq invades Kuwait. 
• December 6, 1990: First ship carrying the 7th Corps equipment 
arrives in Saudi Arabia from Germany. 
• February 6, 1991: the 7th Corps finished its buildup with the arrival 
of the final 3rd Armored Division equipment. 
• February 24, 1991: Ground attack begins. General Schwarzkopf decided 
to accelerate the main attack of the 7th Corps by fifteen hours.69 
Previously mentioned, the main attack forces were the 7th Corps and the 18l 
Airborne Corps. In particular, the 7th Corps's missions were to attack deep into the Iraq 
defenses, cut the Iraqi lines of communication and destroy the Republican Guards forces 
in the Kuwait Theater of Operations. General Frederick Franks, Commander of the 
7th Corps, in the time of Desert Storm, recalled, 
As I looked at the disposition of the Iraqi forces, the mission we 
were given, the troops I had available to me and the time that we 
had, we had three fights: we had to fight against the front line Iraqi 
infantry, in essence the Iraqi 7th Corps, as it turns out. Then it was 
a fight against the tactical reverse, which was positioned right 
behind the front line infantry divisions; then it was a fight against 
the Republican Guards. So those three fights had to be sequenced 
in a way that would allow us to have our point of main effort 
initially at the breach and when the success of the breach was 
assured then to shift that point of main effort to mass against the 
Republican Guard, so essentially we had three fights, those three. 
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Without a doubt, the 7th Corps was the largest tactical unit on the battlefield. 
It was equivalent in size to the numbered field armies of World War II and Korea, but 
capable of creating several times the effective speed and firepower of those older units. 
The 7th Corps had 146,000 American and British soldiers, five 
divisions, essentially five armored divisions, although one was a 
mechanized infantry division and one was a cavalry division, 
essentially five armored divisions. The 7th Corps had close to 1,600 
tanks, Corps consumed well over two million gallons of fuel a day; 
it had a support command, vital logistics support command of over 
26,000 soldiers, fifteen hospitals, over eight hundred helicopters, a 
sizeable force, a lot of moving parts.71 
Speaking about the strategic mobility of the U.S. heavy forces such as 7th Army's 
Corps, Lieutenant General Calvin Waller, Deputy Commander of Central Command 
during the operation Desert Storm, stressed that, 
When you look at the total size of this force and when you want to 
compare the size of it, it is 130,000 souls, men and women in that 
Corps, that's larger than many of our cities in the United States. I 
mean when you look at the number of divisions that it brought with 
it, with the artillery groups, with the air defense group, with the 
battalions of support, with the engineering battalions, with the 
artillery battalions, with all of the things that must support this 
entire Corps, you are talking about moving the equivalent of a city 
of 130,000 people, and let's just take a city of 130,000 people in 
the United States and say pick it up and move everything that's in 
that city, lock stock and barrel, 7,000 miles away, or 4,000 miles 
over the ocean I would say, less than what it was from the United 
States to Saudi Arabia, but that's the equivalent of what we had to 
do, move 130,000 people that belonged to the 7th Corps from 
Europe to the desert in Saudi Arabia, house them, feed them, 
clothe them, outfit them with everything that they needed from a 
toothbrush to a toilet or to a shower or what have you, an 
enormous undertaking logistically.72 
As a result, the f Corps had less time to integrate and to prepare its forces for 
battle than the other established units. Moreover, the 7th Corps training was for a Western 
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European, NATO's conflict of the pre-1989 doctrine. Trained for a specific type of battle 
and trained in specific ways, moving to the Middle East environment and the Central 
Command (CENTCOM) arena meant a different way of waging war for the 7th Corps and 
its commanders. On the other hand, the 18th Airborne Corps was based in the United 
States and prepared mentally for a variety of different theaters and contingencies. The 
result was that the 18th Airborne Corps demonstrated more flexibility in regards to 
accommodating CENTCOM operations than the 7th Corps with its narrower mission 
focus. It should be noted the broader 18th Airborne Corps focus and training included 
extra emphasis on the CENTCOM area of operations in the 10 years leading to the Gulf 
War. This further emphasized the different orientations between the two corps. 
In sum, the ground campaign was clearly a success and the final, crucial element 
in a decisive Coalition victory. The Coalition forged an effective fighting force, destroyed 
much of the Iraqi army, and liberated Kuwait while sustaining light casualties. 
This victory was achieved through detailed planning and 
aggressive and strict execution according to the dictates of 
established doctrine. However, one hundred hours of ground 
combat is too short a period to form comprehensive judgments 
about specific strengths or shortcomings. In addition, the theater of 
operations, the enemy and the global political situation were 
unique. Nonetheless, the Operation Desert Storm victory was 
unquestionably enabled by many years of thought, realistic 
planning, new doctrinal concepts, new unit designs and structures, 
an investment strategy for equipment modernization, and a training 
strategy for all components. 
Nevertheless, a nation that wins a conflict is often set up to lose the next one. If it 
is satisfied with the status quo of its forces and doctrine, it is apt to fight future wars in a 
73
 Jeffrey T. Richelson, Operation Desert Storm: Ten Years After, A National Security Archive, Electronic 
Briefing Book, 01.17.2001, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB39/ 
74
 Andrew P. Leyden, "Gulf War Debriefing Book: An After-Action Report," 
htrp://www.levden.corn/gulfwar/surnmarv.html 
31 
predictable manner. Conversely, losing and bystander nations often become innovative, 
rebuilding and rethinking warfare to ensure victory in the next conflict. Due to an 
abundance of resources, the U.S. military could be effective with less than optimum 
integration. It would be unwise to depend on abundant resources to ensure victory in 
future conflicts. Despite the success of the Operation Desert Shield, strategic deployment 
of U.S. forces to the Persian Gulf took too long—about 150 days for five divisions and 
205 days for the entire deployment.75 As pointed out before, it took roughly a month 
before the U.S. Army had its first division-sized heavy force ready for operations in 
Saudi Arabia. Fortunately, the enemy was totally passive during the strategic deployment 
of U.S. forces. Unquestionably all potential future U.S. opponents took note of the fate 
that befell the Iraqis due to ceding to the U.S. a lengthy, undisturbed deployment period. 
The U.S. had time to prepare its ground offensive while coalition- 
building, political and diplomatic efforts, and commercial 
sanctions ran their courses. The ability to rapidly move robust 
fighting forces would be a key challenge. The ground campaign 
was conducted by heavy, airborne, and air assault forces, all of 
which depended on large, bulky equipment for much of their 
combat power. Ways to improve strategic lift and tactical mobility 
continue to be a major priority.76 
Moreover, joint operations were not really tested. Air-land battle and true joint 
combined arms integration were not precisely realized during the Gulf War. With 
abundant, available airpower, in this conflict, there was not the pressing need to force 
integration. However, "the Gulf War was obviously not a failure. Instead Desert Storm 
served to reinforce the trends of the preceding two decades in the American military 
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culture."77 Therefore, the lessons from Operation Desert Storm must be kept in context. 
If the United States fails to integrate effectively in its next major conflict, it may pay a 
price in both lives and results. Military forces will generally fight the way they train; 
however, 
....even the most intensive training will be less-than-adequate 
preparation for actual combat. Veterans of combat agree that 
certain vital lessons can be learned only under fire. In general, it 
seems that nothing but experience teaches soldiers and armies how 
to hold the delicate balance between courage and caution. 
Furthermore, the Gulf War revealed several characteristics of the Army's light- 
heavy force structure. First, the Light Infantry Divisions, a major Army initiative in 
strategic power projection were noteworthy by their absence. While the 82d Airborne 
Division did deploy, it quickly assumed the title of "speed bump" in the face of an enemy 
with huge numbers of armored vehicles. General Norman Schwarzkopf pointed out that: 
The 82nd airborne troops that were over there used to facetiously 
refer to themselves as "Iraqi tank speed bumps," because they were 
light infantry and did not have the heavy anti-tank weapons they 
needed.79 
In addition, the operational immobility of heavy forces was further revealed 
during the Operation Joint Endeavor, the deployment of the U.S. Army forces to Bosnia 
during the winter of 1995-1996. As an example, the deployment of a reinforced brigade 
of only four armored and mechanized infantry battalions from southern Germany via rail 
and roads took nearly two months.80 Moreover, the U.S. Army learned the importance of 
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speed in Kosovo where it took a month to ship 24 Apache helicopters 800 miles from 
Germany to Albania.81 As a matter of fact, recent events such as Kosovo confirms that 
conflicts fought for less than vital interests will continue to challenge the U.S. national 
security. Hence, the U.S. Army must also develop a realistic doctrine for winning them 
based on its own practical experience.82 However, it will be hard to deal with those 
challenges. Brig. Gen. Bantz J. Craddock, the 1st Infantry Division assistant division 
commander, who commanded the Task Force Falcon, the U.S. element of NATO's 
Kosovo peacekeeping force (KFOR), during the initial stages of the operation was 
confident when he said, 
It is very difficult to conduct a peace support operation of the 
magnitude of this one and deploy in from multiple locations, in 
theater, out of theater...air, sea and land, coordinate it while you're 
trying to move into an area with no infrastructure and establish 
base camps at two locations....Then you have to get base camps 
built, which you have to secure. I think the lesson learned there is 
that when you try to run two major undertakings simultaneously, 
you must have a lot of force available and a very robust and deep 
command and control system. Peace operations highlight the 
responsibility, the dependence, the great emphasis that we must put 
on leadership at the lower levels—the junior leaders, the corporals, 
the sergeants, lieutenants. You can't centralize command and 
control in an operation like this. You have to decentralize it. For 
the military professional, you always have to focus on the high 
intensity. Our mission is to fight and win our nation's wars, but 
there has to be another focus on the peace support operations. If 
you understand that peace operations will decentralize the structure 
more than the high intensity, it will put a premium on individual, 
small-unit leaders.83 
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In sum, both Operations Desert Storm and Operations Joint Endeavor revealed the 
very large intra-theater logistic support needed to provision and move heavy armored and 
mechanized forces. The 100-hour ground campaign required a massive shift of supplies 
through the use of thousands of heavy cargo trucks and heavy equipment transporters. 
Operation Joint Endeavor required the extensive use of rail and road support to move one 
reinforced heavy Army brigade out of southern Germany to Bosnia over a 90-day period. 
Therefore, aero-motorized units would have had far better operational agility in a similar 
circumstance. 
The confidence in the successful attempt of the joint operation during the Gulf 
War has found strong support within the U.S. military and reflected a "new" American 
way of war. This was under the principle of Decisive Force meaning "the use of 
overwhelming force in order to win without exposing American forces to protracted 
conflict,"84 the U.S. Armed Forces, to a certain extent, failed to integrate fully its combat 
forces into an effective joint warfare. Mostly, the war was conducted by airpower. 
Although during the phase of ground operations, there was some integration with ground- 
controlled deep fire and aviation forces, the integration was not as extensive as it could 
have been. The bottom line was that the failure to establish effective procedures for air- 
ground integration, in particular when the conflict entered the ground attack phase, 
contributed to the failure to accomplish one of the primary objectives of the war—the 
destruction of the Republican Guard forces. Therefore, "the more the services can get 
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away from linear thinking and begin thinking in depth and simultaneous attack, the more 
effective the combat capability will be."85 
In the aftermath of the Operation Desert Storm, Congress mandated the 
Department of Defense to reassess strategic mobility requirements in light of the 
changing world environment. The October 1993 "Bottom-Up Review" concluded that the 
military could increase the ability to deploy only through investments in airlift, sealift, 
equipment prepositioning, deployment infrastructure, and related initiatives. Hence, the 
U.S. Army recognized that the world environment would continue to change.86 
As a result, the next step of restructuring the active component of the U.S. Army 
from 12 to 10 divisions was announced by Secretary of the Army Togo D. West, Jr., and 
Chief of Staff, Army, General Gordon R. Sullivan. The plan stabilized the force an 
active-duty end strength level of 495,000 soldiers as the Army prepared to transform into 
the force of the 21st century. Accordingly to this plan, the ten-division Army would 
consist of four light divisions and six heavy divisions, all stationed at existing 
installations. All divisions would consist of three active-component brigades. Some 
divisions, such as the 2nd Infantry Division at Ft. Lewis would have one brigade stationed 
at a different location. Four corps headquarters would remain in the force structure: First 
Corps at Ft. Lewis, Third Corps at Ft. Hood, Fifth Corps in Germany, and Eighteenth 
Airborne Corps at Ft. Bragg.87 
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In summary, what the U.S. Army has lacked since 1945 are medium forces that 
combine a degree of mobility, firepower, and protection greater than the generally foot- 
mobile light forces, yet are less strategically and operationally cumbersome than the 
heavy armored and mechanized units. The latter require either relatively slow sealift, 
rail/heavy equipment transporter support in order to deploy into areas where forces are 
not already stationed. 
During the Cold War, the primary and potentially most challenging of the U.S. 
Army missions were the defense of Western Europe and Korea, which were associated 
with armor-heavy division-based units greatly depended upon prepositioned equipment 
sets and sealift. Since 1991 the U.S. Army has taken certain steps that have enhanced the 
strategic ability to deploy its traditional heavy forces. 
In fact, lower intensity but higher frequency operations have pointed out an 
inadequacy in the structure of the U.S. Army. Its heavy divisions, well suited and forward 
stationed for Western European war, needed a considerable amount of time to deploy to 
Southwest Asia during the Gulf War in 1990. Since the strategic environment can 
frequently change faster than the force structure can adapt, the national security strategy, 
military doctrine, and the allocation of resources can also change. 
Today, the U.S. Army is challenged to deploy heavy formations quickly to all of 
the locations it is required to go. Conversely, the U.S. Army's light forces can deploy 
quickly around the globe but lack the lethality, survivability and staying power of heavy 
forces. Therefore, the medium-weight brigade-size unit force structure has been 
determined to be just the right size to combine arms (armor, infantry, artillery, engineers). 
With the enlargement of the division structure, it becomes harder to fight as an entity. 
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As a result, in 1999, the U.S. Army announced a "New Vision" of its 
transformation calling for a future capability to put a brigade-combat team anywhere in 
the world in 96 hours after liftoff—for stability and also support operations and for 
warfighting. This army can deploy a warfighting division on the ground in 120 hours and 
five divisions in 30 days—a capability that will further increase the Army's ability to 
fight as part of a joint force and win the nation's wars. As expected, a new U.S. Army 
warfighting organization will not only be more deployable and effective in Joint 
operations, but the reorganized information age ground forces will also be significantly 
less expensive to operate, maintain, and modernize than the U.S. Army's current Cold 
War division-based organizations. 
Indeed, the United States must opt for reform and reorganize of the nation's 
ground forces and avoid repeating a historic mistake of always fielding an effective army 
just in time to avoid defeat, but too late to deter an aggressor.88 
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III.    STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT AND SECURITY ISSUES 
By analyzing some threats brought by the strategic environment in the new world 
order, the purpose of this chapter is to show tight links among issues of strategic 
environment, national security, military doctrine, and force structure as well.JThe period 
after the Cold War has been characterized by rapid power transitions: the world has 
become highly unpredictable. In fact, the end of the Cold War brought dramatic changes 
in international security and relations. Even though military power has become truly 
unipolar, by the existence of the U.S. Armed Forces, economic power is still a multipolar 
system structured by three centers of power: the United States, Japan, and Europe, which 
shape the strategic environment of the 21st century. Hence, the global security system of 
the early international century will be configured into three tiers each defined by 
economics and the degree of governability. 
The first tier will include the technologically advanced states of 
Western Europe, North America, and the Pacific Rim. Intense 
economic competition may occasionally lead to political conflict 
and even spark full-blown information warfare, but there will be 
no traditional warfare within the first tier. Second tier regions will 
retain most features of Cold War era nation-states. Periods of rapid 
internal political transition will occur cyclically and often will be 
violent. Second tier states may occasionally resort to conventional, 
inter-state war, and will retain large land armies equipped with 
some sophisticated weapons systems. The third tier will experience 
ungovernability, occasional anarchy, endemic violence, severe 
ecological degradation, the politicization of primal loyalties, and 
political fragmentation. Third tier states may engage in short, 
spasmodic wars with each other.89 
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Therefore, geopolitical interactions based upon the international order, stability 
and the balance of power will continue to influence the national interests of the United 
States; however, global restraint, as maintained through the balance of power during the 
Cold War, will be more difficult to achieve as the world may disintegrate into areas of 
multipolar tensions with competing regional authority. 
Moreover, some states, such as the former Yugoslavia's Federation, may 
disintegrate into smaller, ethnically based units. This fragmentation will cause both 
interstate and intrastate conflict. It can be assumed that these regional powers would not 
try to match American air, land, and sea capabilities and would use indirect or 
asymmetrical means. However, the United States must anticipate the rise of regional 
racial, economic and religious tensions along with threats from fanatic religious groups, 
criminal cartels, and transnational terrorists, which will challenge the U.S.'s vital national 
interests. 
The U.S. National Security Strategy defines "vital national interests," as interests 
including the physical security of the U.S. territory and the security of the territory of the 
U.S.'s formal allies.90 These interests also include the safety of American citizens at 
home and abroad as well as the U.S. security in maintaining access to trade and resources 
that are vital to its economic prosperity. To defend these vital interests, the U.S. must be 
prepared to use military force "unilaterally and decisively."91 Obviously, it will make 
more sense to react quickly to a threatening situation, which, if left unattended, might 
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grow into a disaster requiring a massive intervention that could be costly monetarily and 
in the lose of lives.92 
Considering the issue of strategic environment, one must emphasize that the 
United States and its allies continue to face the threat of coercion and large-scale, cross- 
border aggression by hostile states with significant military power. As an example, 
President of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, has once again challenged the international order by 
forming an army "to liberate Jerusalem" from Israeli rule and has already announced the 
mobilization of more than 6.5 million volunteers for a jihad, (Muslim holy war), against 
the Jewish state.93 Another recent example confirms an argument about the fragile nature 
of global security in today's world. In February 2001, Russian military forces were 
engaged in a large-scale exercise involving strategic and conventional military forces. 
Analysts viewed the exercises as purposely timed to exert political influence on new the 
U.S. administration and its plans for a national missile defense, which Russia opposes. 
"These exercises appear to be Russia deciding to deal with the West after the fashion of 
the Soviet Union in the early 1980s, namely to bluster in order to try to prevent an 
American strategic overture, in this case missile defense," R. James Woolsey, a former 
94 CIA director and arms control negotiator, said in an interview. 
Additionally, increasingly capable and violent terrorist groups, drug cartels, and 
international crime organizations directly threaten the U.S. national security and 
undermine U.S. policies and alliances. For example, Osama bin Laden, the alleged 
terrorist who officially declared "war" against the U.S., tried to buy uranium by spending 
9] Ibid., p.6. 
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$1.5 million in the black-market in order to build nuclear weapons in the early 1990s.95 
However, faced with the reality of the U.S. military intervention, opposing forces will 
likely avoid a direct conflict with the U.S. Armed Forces by using asymmetric 
capabilities. For example, even Russia, according to its Defense Minister, Igor Sergeyev, 
is willing to make contingency plans to respond to President Bush administration's 
antimissile plans. He said that Russia was not going to launch a new missile buildup, 
which it cannot afford, but "asymmetrical" technologies that would penetrate any missile 
shield.96 
The feature of the asymmetric warfare is to attack your enemy's weakness and to 
avoid the enemy's strength. Such threats also include guerilla, paramilitary,.and Special 
Forces. Regardless of the nature or origin of these threats, these armored groups, 
equipped with man-portable air defense systems, anti-tank guided missiles, mortars, 
explosives, and machine guns will be capable of not only achieving limited objectives 
during high-tempo combat operations, but also during long-term guerilla operations. 
Furthermore, the global proliferation of weapons technologies and military hardware 
poses increasing challenges to regional stability. As a matter of fact: 
The world in the late twenty century clearly has become a more 
dangerous habitation than ever before for all human beings.... The 
age-old pattern of conflict among and between people has become 
intertwined with newly created capabilities for global destruction. 
In this environment of challenge and conflict, the United State 
bears broad responsibilities for maintaining a precarious peace and 
protecting its own and its allies' interests. The U.S. Army has been 
given challenging missions and heavy burdens by the makers of 
national policy. The Army not only must prepare for war that could 
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begin today but must also anticipate the nature and evolution of 
likely future conflicts.97 
As a matter of fact, the U.S. Army is quite strong on the battlefield because of its 
superiority in information management, precision indirect fires and close combat. 
Potential adversaries have watched as the US conducted operations since Desert Storm 
and these adversaries have learned how to challenge its armed forces in asymmetric ways 
rather than confront the U.S. Army head-on in a conventional fight. They will seek to 
create conditions where an enemy's relative advantage cannot be applied, is degraded or 
is neutralized. As a result, a country that chose to challenge the U.S. would be forced to 
find another way including asymmetric warfare. 
America's unrivaled military superiority means that potential 
enemies.... that choose to attack us will be more likely to resort to 
terror instead of conventional military assault. Moreover, easier 
access to sophisticated technology means that the destructive 
power available to terrorists is greater than ever. Adversaries may 
thus be tempted to use unconventional tools, such as weapons of 
mass destruction, to target our cities and disrupt the operations of 
our government. 
In addition, the nature of the existing and emerging threats plus continued 
worldwide urbanization will make military operations in regions with weak infrastructure 
(roads, rail, bridges) and complex/urban terrain extremely likely. Future adversaries 
tactics may be unconventional and they will exploit the use of cities, populated areas, and 
complex terrain in order to negate the U.S. Army superior capabilities. As in the recent 
experience in Kosovo, the U.S. Army's units frequently operate in complex and urban 
terrain where adversaries could negate many of the U.S. Army's advantages. Indeed, to 
97
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ensure a quick and decisive victory with minimum casualties, U.S. forces must be 
prepared to face the potential challenges of asymmetric threats. 
In sum, more probable than major theater war (MTW) is the possibility that the 
United States will be confronted by a whole series of lesser crises or small-scale 
contingency (SSC) operations. Civil wars, armed struggles between religious and ethnic 
groups are all examples of the kinds of operations where the U.S. Army could 
conceivably be deployed. Many of these future conflicts would occur in an urban 
environment. What is more, areas where such breakdowns in civil order could occur are 
where the United States does not have permanently stationed forces. Indeed, this 
changing reality has a significant impact on how the future U.S. Army should be 
configured." According to the study, "The Future of American Landpower: Strategic 
Challenges for the 21st Century Army," several strategic challenges will be crucial for the 
Army in the future security environment: 
• Reconcile Long-Term and Short-Term Imperatives. Strategists 
must maximize the chances of long-term success while minimizing 
short-term risk. If the future global security system is relatively 
benign, the Army can minimize the resources it devotes to long- 
term modernization and force development. But if conflict 
dominates the future global security system, the United States must 
accept greater short-term risk and focus on force development and 
modernization. 
• Maximize Efficiency. American military forces will remain small in 
comparison to the number and scope of tasks they will be given. 
This creates an overriding need for efficiency... Technology 
probably holds greater promise of bringing dramatic improvements 
in efficiency, but it requires extensive investment. Reliance on 
technology can also generate unintended adverse effects... 
challengers might seek low-tech, asymmetric responses to 
counterbalance the American advantage. 
Hans A. Binnendijk and Patrick Clawson, "The Strategic Assessment 1997, Flashpoints and Force 
Structure," Washington D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 
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• Undertake a Controlled Institutional Revolution. The historical 
boundaries of landpower may be stretched as the basic concept of 
national security expands to include, e.g., protection against violent 
threats to national information and information systems, the 
environment, and public health. Hence, the Army must decide 
whether warfighting is the function for which it exists or simply 
one function among several.1 
The chronicles of military history emphasize the importance of preparing for 
future security challenges. As Clausewitz observed, every age has indeed been marked 
with its own kind of war.101 
Since 1945 the United Sates has faced seven major military 
challenges that required deployment of significant forces and 
operations in the face of a potentially hostile force: the Berlin 
Airlift, the Korean War, Lebanon (1958), the Dominican Republic, 
Vietnam, Grenada, and Desert Storm. This does not include the 
Bay of Pigs, the Cuban Blockade, Central America of the 1980s, 
Just Cause, or the many moves and countermoves of the Cold War 
such as the deployment of forces when the Berlin Wall went up. 
Thus, there was a significant confrontation once every seven years 
on average, well within the planning horizon of the Department of 
Defense.102 
Historically, the U.S. Army has been criticized for preparing for the last war. 
Since the end of the Cold War era, however, the U.S. Army has been willing to create a 
force capable of winning the next war in an era characterized by a volatile international 
security environment, accelerated technological advances, shifts in military art, and 
forecasts of increasingly constrained fiscal resources. Today, in fact, the United States is 
at the height of its influence and prosperity. The United States remains the world's most 
100
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powerful force protecting peace and universal values of democracy. However, at a time 
of rapid globalization, the U.S. must be vigilant to defend its national interests. 
In summary, the world continues to evolve into a more dynamic, uncertain, and 
complex environment. Since the end of the Cold War nearly a decade ago, there have 
been repeated calls for the U.S. Army to make major changes to accommodate a 
transformed geostrategic environment. Information technology advances have created 
powerful asymmetric threat options for potential adversaries, and continue to expand the 
potential nature of future conflict. Although the mentioned above "forces" will be unable 
to match the combat power of heavy U.S. weaponry, these forces still pose difficult 
challenges to the U.S. and its Army. 
On January 5, 2000, the White House released a report entitled, "A National 
Security Strategy for a New Century." The document preface states, "we are pursuing a 
forward-looking national security strategy for the new century. This report ... sets forth 
that strategy. Its three core objectives are: 
To enhance America's security. 
To bolster America's economic prosperity. 
To promote democracy and human rights abroad."103 
Despite the many U.S.'s of significant advantages, this fractured world with 
growing threats of terrorism, horrible drug problems, organized crime and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, complicates the U.S. ability to achieve 
these objectives. Potential regional aggressors possess a range of capabilities that could 
bring significant dangers to the U.S. National Security and operations conducted by the 
U.S. Armed Forces. The common predictive threads for the evolving global security 
The report "A National Security Strategy for a New Century" can be accessed at the following site: 
http://www.pub. Whitehouse.govAWI/Publications/html/Publications.htrnl 
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environment are: significant complexity, wildly ranging scenarios of power centers and 
polarities, multiple revolutions across several domains, and profound uncertainty. 
More importantly, interdependence will be the defining characteristic of the future 
global security system. Because of interdependence, the global security system will 
continue to experience cycles with periods dominated by violence followed by 
widespread resolution of conflicts. As an example, over the past decade the Army has 
been involved in more missions than in the previous 40 years. Since 1989, the Army has 
deployed ready forces in response to National Command Authority directives 35 times. 
Some of these deployments have been brief; others have evolved into ongoing 
commitments of our forces. 
The U.S. Army has been in Kosovo for a year, Bosnia for five, Southwest Asia 
for 10, the Sinai for 18, Korea for 50 and Europe for 55 years.105 As a result, the U.S 
Army must be prepared to resolve those emergencies in the scale from small-scale 
contingencies operations (SSC) to major theater of war (MTW). The future will be even 
more complex, uncertain, and challenging than today. There is a growing trend toward 
asymmetric challenges, such as information warfare, weapons of mass destruction, 
threats of chemical munitions, terrorism, missile strikes against the homeland, and covert 
attacks against commercial and financial infrastructures. As a result, a very complicated 
threat-mix requires the U.S. Army to have, as defined by former Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Colin Powell, a capabilities-based force instead of a threats-based 
force. 
104
 Robert Frost, The Growing Imperative to Adopt "Flexibility " as an American Principal of War, 
Strategic Studies Institute, The U.S. Army War College, 10.15.1999, p.29. 
105
 Press Conference Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera and Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric K. 
Shinseki, Association of the United States Army Washington, D.C. 10.12.1999, 
http ://www.fas.org/man/dod-101 /armv/unit/docs/r 19991014ausapress .htm 
47 
Overall, the U.S. possess strong political, economic and information power and 
remains the most forceful military power in the world, and the U.S. Army, as an 
"instrument of the U.S. political will,"106 provides the land component of the U.S.'s 
superiority. Today's light forces of the U.S. Army are certainly good for various missions 
conducted in different types of terrain including urban, but did not have adequate 
capabilities of lethality and survivability needed for sustained conventional operations. 
Furthermore, the lack of alarming military threats today does not discount the rise of a 
major military competitor in the future. While the U.S. does not anticipate a threat in the 
near future, the U.S. Army should be prepared in the near- and far-term to respond 
forcefully to a currently unidentified opponent. The U.S. Army must be prepared to meet 
tomorrow's security challenges by implementing a strategy that will transform it from a 
heavy force to a more versatile "medium-weight brigade-size" force. "America cannot 
afford to enter the new millennium as a nostalgic posthegemon with expensive industrial- 
age armed forces that simply do not fit the new strategic environment. It practical terms, 
this involves replacing old military structure and concepts." 107 
106
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IV.    FISCAL YEAR 2001 AND THE U.S. ARMY 
TRANSFORMATION 
Historically, the U.S. and its Army have been poorly prepared for many wars or at 
least for their first battles. The reasons for the lack of America's preparedness for war 
vary, but key among them was complacency in times of peace. The American military 
leadership did not establish a link between their national prosperity and their military 
excellence. That kind of national complacency led to early disasters in past wars. 
Additionally, the apparent contradiction between "time" and "money" found its reflection 
in the now-famous observation of General, George Marshall during the U.S. preparations 
in the earliest days of World War II, "Yesterday, we had time but no money. Today we 
have money but no time." Today, the U.S. Army is moving to break that cycle of history 
by attempting to transform itself during an unprecedented period—a time of relative 
peace, of unrivaled economic prosperity and of stampeding technological progress. 
As a matter of fact, the U.S. Army transformation strategy is designed to 
restructure and modernize the present Army from a Cold War dominated arms-heavy 
division-based force to a full spectrum medium-weight brigade-size force geared to 21st 
century requirements.108 In order to accomplish this goal, the U.S. Army intends to: 
• Accelerate the research and development of the Future Combat System 
(FCS); 
• Provide funding for the Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV), which offers a 
baseline capability for a mounted Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT); 
los "jransformatjon for the 21st Century. Initial Brigade Combat Team," Data can be achieved through a 
web-site: http://www.lewis.armv.mil/transformation/ 
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• Provide funding in FY-2001 to establish two Initial Brigade Combat 
Teams (IBCTs) at Fort Lewis, Washington; 
• Accelerate specific programs to improve strategic responsiveness, increase 
lethality of light forces, and recapitalize legacy systems; 
• Maintain the focus on information dominance; 
• Restructure programs that did not meet the Army's vision of providing 
resources for the U.S. Army Transformation.109 
In fact, many of these key points connect with the budget issue, which is under 
the specific relationships between the Congress and the U.S. Army. Fortunately, the 
Congress, in the words of Jerry Lewis, Chairman of the House Appropriations Defense 
Subcommittee, strongly supports the U.S. Army's commitment: 
We are encouraging the Army—and all of the armed forces—to 
embrace changes that will make sure they are ready for the 
challenges of the 21st Century. We must make that investment, for 
while ensuring peace is expensive, the alternative is war, whose 
costs are unimaginable. The Army—and all our armed forces— 
must find ways to meet the rapidly developing threats to world 
safety that we have seen in our last few engagements and Congress 
heartily supports this commitment.110 
Under those circumstances, in July 19, 2000, the House voted overwhelmingly 
367 to 58 approving the House-Senate conference report on the $288 billion Department 
of Defense spending plan for FY-2001. The legislation added nearly $1.6 billion over 
FY-2000 to help the U.S. Army, according to its Transformation Plan, quickly develop 
two medium-weight brigade-size combat teams as well as new lightweight combat 
vehicles using the newest technology. In sum, the FY-2001 budget added: 
Ibid., http://www.lewis.armv.mil/transformation/ 
Congressman Jerry Lewis, Press Release, 
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• $150 million in development and $170 million over the budget request in 
procurement accounts to completely test, equip and field the first IBCT. 
• $500 million to equip a second IBCT. 
• $46 million to accelerate the effort to develop future combat 
vehicles.111 
Overall, the conference report allocated $866 million over the budget request to 
fully fund one IBCT and equip a second in FY-2001, and to speed research and 
development of the future combat vehicle. The FY-2001 budget has been constructed on 
two fundamental tenets: 
• The first is to continue to provide combat ready forces to support 
National Security and National Military Strategies by preserving 
their capabilities to win two near-simultaneous theater wars. 
• The second tenet of this FY-2001 is the process of transforming 
the U.S. Army into a force that is strategically responsive and 
dominant at every point on the full spectrum of operations from a 
small-scale contingence to a major theaters war.112 
In fact, this FY-2001 has become both one of ensuring the continued superiority 
of the U.S. Army as held in the past, and one devoted to changing the Army into a full 
spectrum force that is strategically responsive and dominant for the future. More 
importantly, the Congress by adopting the FY-2001 budget confirmed its strong support 
of the U.S. Army's transformation strategy. Regarding funding, General, Eric K. 
Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, said: 
.... we are pleased to tell you we are well on our way to 
transforming our Army. In the first year of Army transformation, 
efforts to win congressional support were successful. Congress 
provided the money to push forward objective force research and 
development, and Army transformation's impact from the outset 
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has   been   to   uplift   the   Army's   science   and   technology 
community.113 
In summary, the U.S. Army, with strong support from the Congress and from 
President G.W. Bush's Administration, is willing to take advantage of auspicious 
conditions: 
• Relative peace worldwide; 
• Unrivaled economic prosperity without real evidence of declining; 
• Overwhelming technological progress. 
Because of these factors, FY-2001 could afford to maintain the process of 
transforming the U.S. Army force structure by providing sufficient funding for new 
combat vehicles, arms, organization design and development of military doctrine. Indeed, 
the U.S. Army should be very content and proud for now it is a more deployable, 
versatile and responsive full spectrum force by implementing two new combat "medium- 
weight" brigades. 
Congressman Jerry Lewis, Press Release, 
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THE U.S. ARMY UNDER THE TRANSFORMATION 
STRATEGY OF 1999 
A.       NECESSITIES FOR THE U.S. ARMY TRANSFORMATION OF 1999 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the means of reforming the U.S. Army. 
Transforming the U.S. Army into a new combat structure will enhance strategic 
responsiveness with better theater agility and greater combat power. The Doctrine for 
Joint Operations lists the following "Principles of War,"114 which reflect Americans' 




Economy of Forces; 
Maneuver; 




Indeed, when considering the transformation strategy for the U.S. Army, it is 
essential to recall the American principles of war because an obvious relationship exists 
between the principles of war and the basic doctrine, which shapes the entire structure of 
the U.S. Army. In addition, the increased role of the military in ad hoc peacekeeping 
operations has challenged the U.S. military's current organizational structure for the 
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quick deployment of troops from the various services. Rapid technological advances and 
post-Cold War strategic uncertainty also complicate the U.S. military's organizational 
structure.117 
Taken together, the demands of the strategic environment and the realities of the 
U.S. Army's current condition necessitate fundamental changes. With that understanding, 
the U.S. Army began to transform itself. The U.S. Army transformation was launched by 
the U.S. Army's leadership (represented by the Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera and 
Chief of Staff of the Army, General, Eric K. Shinseki) during the Association of the 
United States Army's Annual Meeting in Washington, D.C. in October 1999.118 This is 
the vision of how the U.S. Army should transform itself from a Cold War, industrial age 
Army into a 21st -century information age Army: 
.... An Army that gives the American nation greater and more 
relevant capabilities to react to fast-changing world events—a 
lighter, more lethal, more deployable force with the mental and 
physical agility to be dominant at every point of the spectrum of 
operations.119 
In order to become more deployable and maintain lethality, the U.S. Army has 
fielded a prototype brigade-size force that would use off-the-shelf systems and would 
initiate the new concepts for organizational design and training. In fact, the new strategy 
of the U.S. Army Transformation is designed to ensure that the U.S. Army achieves the 
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vision while maintaining the ability to conduct and to win battles over the course of the 
transformation. 
The Secretary of the U.S. Army, Louis Caldera, and Chief of Staff of the Army, 
Eric K. Shinseki, unveiled a vision of a more strategically responsive U.S. Army saying, 
"Army transformation represents the strategic transition we will have to undergo to shed 
our Cold War designs, to prepare ourselves now for the crises and wars of the 21s 
century. It is also a test of our institutional agility and our heart as an Army." 
Therefore, the U.S. Army is willing to create five interim brigades and to develop an 
interim force division structure in the active force. 
The newly organized force is built around a common unit design and combat 
systems that is C-130 aircraft deployable. This ultimate goal will allow the U.S. Army to 
lighten the force significantly without compromising combat capability: 
First among these new challenges is the need for a much smaller 
force "footprint," characterized by fewer but more capable 
attacking troops and platforms supported by an even smaller 
logistics element.122 
In short, the main intent of this transformation plan is to field common equipment, 
across common organizations. This new medium-weight brigade will be able to operate 
across the full spectrum of military actions. In order to accomplish its goals, the U.S. 
Army must also reduce its logistical footprint. This means developing a systems approach 
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to fielding platforms as well as revolutionizing the way the Army transports and sustains 
the force: 
Look at one feature called deployability that means to be 
sustainable without a large logistical footprint. As an example, the 
heaviest part of an armored division is not the tanks and other 
armor vehicle. The heaviest part of an armored division is fuel. 
The second heaviest part of an armored division is the ammunition. 
The third heaviest part of an armored division is all the track 
vehicles. So if you can solve the fuel and ammo, if you can get the 
fuel and ammo rates down, then you can begin to achieve force 
effectiveness.123 
As a matter of fact, reducing the numbers of systems will reduce the numbers of 
repair parts needed. Greater fuel efficiencies will also decrease the total weight of 
deploying forces. Deployability will come through a smaller logistic footprint. 
Furthermore, it is necessary to point out that the models of the combat forces, such as a 
brigade-combat combined-arms team, has not been used previously. As a matter of fact, 
in the past, the U.S. built an arms-heavy division-based force for lethality, survivability 
and battlefield mobility to fight in Europe against the Warsaw Pact, and the U.S. Army 
still has all these qualities. 
In accordance with the Defense Department's Bottom-Up Review (1995) of the 
nation's defense needs, the "warfighting organization for the U.S. Army of the future 
looks much like the force structures in the past and present. For instance, the options 
under considerations for a new Army division range from retaining today's basic 
structure while inserting new technologies that can be tailored to specific missions."124 
However, the U.S. Army doesn't have the means that allow it to reach any "hot-spot" 
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quickly, or the abilities to be lethal, survivable, and self-sustained. As a result, the need to 
balance one group of qualities with others has become apparent. 
B.        THE CURRENT STATE OF THE U.S. ARMY 
The U.S. Army's warfighting power today is assembled around two force 
characteristics—heavy forces, that are well equipped for war but difficult to deploy 
strategically; and light forces that can respond rapidly and are well suited for stability and 
support operations but lack staying power against heavy mechanized forces. Today, the 
U.S. Army continues to maintain four active corps headquarters, ten active divisions 







82nd Airborne Division 101st Air-assault Division 1st Armored Division 
10th Light Division 1st Cavalry Division 
25th Light Division 1st Inf. (M) Division 
2nd Inf. Division 
3rd Inf. (M) Division 
4th Inf. (M) Division 
Table 1. Provides the Current Force Structure of the U.S. Army 
Light forces—airborne, air assault, and light infantry divisions—are tailored for 
forcible-entry operations and for operations on restricted terrain, like mountains, jungles, 
and urban areas. Heavy forces—armored and mechanized divisions—are trained and 
equipped for operations against armies employing modern tanks and armored fighting 
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vehicles. Light and heavy forces can operate independently or in combination, providing 
the mix of combat power needed for specific contingencies.126 
Today's problem is that if the U.S. has to conduct forced entry in a conflict 
situation, its options are the 18th Airborne Corps and the Marine Corps. However, the 
dilemma is that the U.S. can get the 18th Airborne Corps and the Marine Corps in quick, 
but then there is the "deployment gap."127 It is a gap because the light forces can be 
deployed very quickly, but then it takes some time to close the heavy force in. 
The operation Desert Storm clearly demonstrated this gap. The 82 Airborne 
Division, as a part of Eighteenth Airborne Corps, deployed very quickly, and then waited 
for the heavy force to arrive, playing the role of "Iraqi tank speed bumps." Therefore, the 
U.S. Army has taken that challenge in order to fulfill the gap between those two 
operational capabilities and to dominate in the full spectrum of military operations. The 
U.S. Army leadership's announced their intention to make the heavy force lighter, to 
make the light force more mobile, more lethal and more survivable. Above all, the 
objective is to erase the distinctions that exist today between heavy and light. However, it 
is crucial to call attention to some misunderstandings, which already exist among the 
military of the U.S. as well as its allies. Regarding this point, the Secretary of the U.S. 
Army, Louis Caldera, highlighted: 
The biggest misconception is that this is only about swapping 
heavy forces in favor of medium forces and not understanding that 
this is not about weight but about capability. It is also about a 
smaller logistical footprint, more responsive formations, more 
lethality in that transformed force. Transformation is just one part 
126
 William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and Congress—1999, 
http://www.dtic.mil/execsec/adrl999/chap5.html 
127
 Colonel, Joseph Rodriguez, "Status of Brigade Combat Team Development at Fort Lewis and the 
Planned Performance Demonstration at Fort Knox," 12.16.1999, The Pentagon, Washington D.C., 
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-l0l/armv/unit/docs/991216-briefing tradoc press.htm 
58 
of the vision that also includes an investment in our people, 
changes in our doctrine and the evolution of the use of information 
1 yo 
technology in warfighting. 
C.       THE U.S. ARMY TRANSFORMATION STRATEGY 
The transformation plan sets the U.S. Army's course on a steady evolution toward 
the Objective Force while remaining trained and ready to meet its National Military 
190 Strategy requirements of its "nonnegotiable contract with the American people," to 
fight and win the nation's wars. In general, the Army's transformation strategy will 
progress along three major paths: 
• The Legacy Force, 
• The Interim Force, 
• The Objective Force.130 
In order to have the time to develop Objective Force capabilities properly, the 
U.S. Army will maintain the Legacy Force, selected formations of key armored and 
aviation systems, to guarantee the warfighting readiness of the U.S. Army. 
The first step in the Army transformation process began by establishing an initial 
force, Which continues today toward full optimization until the requirements associated 
with small-scale contingencies (SSC) are fulfilled. It will also have the capability to be 
involved in stability and support operations (SSO), and with some expansion can conduct 
and fight in a major theater of war (MTW). The first two of these new brigades are 
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medium-weight brigade combat teams, or the Initial Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs), at 
Fort Lewis, WA. They will be followed by a number of interim brigades.131 
The D3CT, the first step toward the Interim Force, will accomplish two goals. 
First, it will give the U.S. Army a better capability for operational deployment to meet 
worldwide requirements. Second, the initial IBCT will validate an organizational and 
operational model for the Interim Force and will be the vanguard of the future Objective 
Force. The conversion of five brigades will complete the second step, which is labeled 
the Interim Force.  Another issue is how these brigades operate within the current U.S. 
Army's divisions, 
One assessment is the possibility of putting three of these brigades 
into an interim, what would be called an interim division.132 
The key path of the U.S. Army Transformation strategy leads to the Objective 
Force. The U.S. Army is going to make technology investments that after 10 to 20 years 
of development will result in new technologies that underpin the Objective Force design. 
In fact, transformation to the Objective Force will include the entire U.S. Army.133 
In summary, the geo-strategic environment will likely call for the rapid 
deployment of high performance combined arms forces over trans-oceanic distances. 
Moreover, in many small-scale contingencies, medium-weight combat units appear more 
versatile than pure light infantry units, especially if there is any expectation of intense 
local combat. Gen. Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, speaking 
about the military's role in peacekeeping and other non-combat missions, said that the 
131
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U.S. must continue to prepare the military for a wide range of missions, "It is naive to 
think that the military will become involved in only those areas that affect our vital 
national interests. Kosovo, indeed a good test of the effects that peacekeeping is having 
on the American military."134 Indeed, the global security environment has changed; 
therefore, the U.S. Army has to be changed as well. 
Today's U.S. Army is essentially a structure shaped with either very light or very 
heavy forces with few medium-weight units. Concerning this point, President G.W. Bush 
said: 
Our military is still organized more for Cold War threats than for 
the challenges of a new century—for industrial age operations, 
rather than for information-age battles. America's forces in the 
next century must be agile, lethal, readily deployable, and require a 
minimum of logistical support.... That means giving U.S. troops 
the technological superiority they need to prevail.135 
Yet, historical experience suggests that technology alone does not bring about a 
revolution in military affairs. Increasingly lethal weapons lead to greater dispersion of 
combat forces and to increases in individual unit mobility. Organizational changes in 
directions that capitalize on human qualities benefit the armies with high quality 
manpower who encourage initiative and develop more flexible and adaptive fighting 
formations.136 The U.S. Army is undergoing a radical transformation. The objective of 
this transformation is to erase the distinction between heavy and light forces. It will make 
light forces more lethal, survivable, and tactically mobile, and heavy forces more 
strategically deployable and agile with a reduced logistical footprint. 
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During the early decades of the 21st Century, the Army of 2025 
will differ from today's Army in two distinct ways. First, it will 
achieve unprecedented strategic and operational speed by 
exploiting information technologies to create a knowledge-based 
organization. Second, it will exhibit tremendous flexibility and 
physical agility through streamlined, seamlessly integrated 
organizations that use new tactics and procedures. The collective 
result will be a versatile, full spectrum, capabilities-based force 
that can decisively respond to any future global contingency.137 
In short, the U.S. Army is on the path of meeting tomorrow's security challenges 
by implementing a strategy that will transform it from a heavy, forward-deployed force to 
a lighter, more versatile, power projection force. As a result, one of the basic decisions 
that the U.S. Army has adopted in the last decade was to continue temporarily the 
existing organizational structure based on division's structure as a basis tactical level and 
simultaneously to modify and transform itself toward "Objective Forces of Twenty First 
Century," where medium-weight brigade-size units will be used either as a leading part of 
expeditionary forces or as a central combat component of future contingencies including 
military operations other than war. Finally, medium-weight brigades or Initial Brigade 
Combat Teams (EBCTs) will allow the U.S. Army to develop thoroughly the doctrine and 
concept of ground forces operations that have the strategic agility of current light forces 
and approach the combat power of current heavy forces. 
Robert H. Scales, Jr., "America's Army: Preparing for Tomorrow's Security Challenges," The U.S. 
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VI.    FIRST STEP—IBCT (FORT LEWIS, WA) 
A.        THE ROLE OF THE BRIGADE 
As mentioned previously, the world geopolitical environment will continue to 
directly affect the U.S. military strategy. This challenge ranges from a conflict with a 
growing superpower or a hostile regional power; or against a less sophisticated, but no 
less dangerous, insurgent force. In support of the U.S. military strategy, the U.S. Army 
has to continue to deter aggression worldwide and if deterrence fails, the U.S. Army 
should be prepared to defeat any enemy across a wide range of threats. Moreover, the 
U.S. Army operations will be varied from aiding to foreign governments to full combat 
operations against well-armed hostile forces. 
In accordance with Field Manual No 7-30 (FM 7-30), the primary mission of the 
brigade, a unit that controls two or more battalions, is to deploy on short notice and 
destroy, capture, or repel enemy forces, using maneuver and shock effect. A brigade's 
chief tactical responsibility is synchronizing the plans and actions of their subordinate 
units to accomplish a single task for the division or corps.138 A brigade is organized to be 
capable of fighting armed conflicts in conventional and various operations other than war 
(OOTW), independently or as part of a joint or multinational headquarters in peacetime 
and conflict environments. In short, the U.S. military doctrine presents basic principles 
that guide the employment of the U.S. Army brigades. 
138
 Field Manual No. 7-30 (FM 7-30), Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 
10.03.1995, http://www.adtdl.armv.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/7-30/toc.htm 
63 
Doctrinally, the infantry brigade is a critical element in the force structure of the 
U.S. Army because of its ability to operate both independently or as part of a division. 
Furthermore, a brigade may deploy as part of Joint Task Forces (JTF) with or without its 
traditional divisional headquarters. A brigade is able to integrate and coordinate different 
kinds of maneuver battalions, field artillery, combat air support, and engineer to 
accomplish its mission. In sum, a brigade provides the link between the division deep and 
close battle.139 
Considering the formation of the Initial Brigade Combat Team (BCT) as a first 
step of the U.S. Army transformation strategy toward Objective Forces, it is necessary 
to look inside the organization, role and missions of two kinds of infantry brigades 
(maneuver and separate), which were recently laid down in the basis the U.S. Army's 
brigade structure. 
In fact, maneuver brigades with their capability for self-support and independent 
action are considered the major combat units of all types of divisions. Maneuver brigades 
are extremely compatible for operating in a wide range of military actions. Each 
maneuver brigade normally controls from two- to five-attached maneuver battalions 
along with different kinds of combat support and combat service support units. Maneuver 
brigades usually operate as part of a division; however, they can also be organized as 
140 
separate units. 
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Separate brigades can control up to five maneuver battalions. Separate brigades 
also have their own cavalry troop, engineer company, military intelligence company, 
military police platoon artillery battalion and support battalion. Additionally, field 
artillery battalions, aviation units, along with combat support and combat service support 
units may be attached to the brigade as required by the brigade's mission. Even though 
separate brigades normally conduct operations under corps command, separate brigades 
can conduct operations like divisional brigades. While separate brigades have a fixed 
organization and can be used to reinforce corps or divisions, division commanders 
establish the organization of their brigades and change their organizations if it is 
necessary to accomplishment a mission. 
The FM 7-30 infantry brigade was assumed to be rapidly deployable rapidly, at a 
division or a corps level, with support units for conducting different kinds of combat 
operations against light enemy forces in any types of terrain, such as forests, jungles, 
mountains, and urban areas. Therefore, the infantry brigade can: 
Conduct operations in all operations other than war activities. 
Conduct small-unit operations. 
Conduct operations with armored or mechanized forces. 
Conduct operations with special operations forces. 
Participate in amphibious operations. 
Conduct air assault operations. 
Conduct airborne operations.14 
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However, some limitations of the infantry brigade had become apparent when the 
new Army brigade's structure was under consideration. Those restrictions for the current 
type of the infantry brigade were and in fact are still included as follows: 
• It does not have the firepower, mobility, or protection of armored and 
mechanized brigades. 
• Maneuver battalions of those brigades are predominantly foot mobile. 
• Infantry soldiers are especially vulnerable to enemy fires while soldiers 
are moving.143 
Indeed, the nature of warfare has changed because of technological advances in 
precision fires, enhanced situational awareness, near-real-time battle command, and the 
mobility and lethality of air and ground maneuvers in order to accomplish the mission 
with minimal casualties. Desert Storm was a great example of the real possibility of such 
a framework. However, remaining highly trained in the traditional way of war, infantry 
brigades must be prepared to adapt to a new framework for the twenty-first century. 
Therefore, the experience of the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, at Ft. Lewis, WA, as a 
working prototype of a new combat brigade team should be considered the first but an 
extremely important step for the strategy of the U.S. Army's transformation. Regarding 
this transition, Col. Joseph Rodriguez said in an interview: 
.... For the near term, the reason we have gone to the Brigade 
Combat Team is the brigade is organized as a brigade combat 
team. The normal brigade in the U.S. Army today is not organized 
as a brigade combat team. They get mission-tailored and task 
organized when they go to combat, or when they go to train. But 
when they're in garrison, they are in garrison as a pure brigade. 
This brigade is a Brigade Combat Team. All the different combat 
143 Brigade, Military Analysis Network, Data can be accessed at the following site: 
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arms, combat support, and combat service support in the brigade, 
all these people rated by the colonel commanding the brigade. 144 
B.       THE   KEY   POINTS   FROM   THE   NEW   BRIGADE   OPERATIONAL 
CONCEPT 
The US Army is transforming the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, at Ft. Lewis 
WA.14D This is the first of a projected six to eight JJBCTs presently in the transformation 
process of medium-weight brigades to meet the full spectrum of combat scenarios. The 
planners started with the maneuver and separate infantry organization as the base, and 
added personnel, weapons and equipment to enhance mobility, lethality and force 
protection. As the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Deputy 
Commanding General for Transformation Maj. Gen James M. Dubik stressed: 
We are not building a high-speed humanitarian assistance force. 
This is a combat force that can compel people in the full spectrum 
of combat; and is able to do this in joint and combined operations 
because there are no single-nation or single-service operations 
anymore. The training that you'll see out there is focused on 
combat capability. But it is a combat force that can operate in the 
actual environments, "a dirty environment," we are dealing with. 
And it has a powerful capability even in conventional combat.14 
The IBCT will be the first step in the Army's transformation strategy. The near 
term intent is to fill the requirement to execute responsive small-scale contingency (SSC) 
operations but it can also operate into stability and support operations (SASO) as well as 
major theater war (MTW) with some augmentation. The IBCT will be rapidly deployable 
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with the possibility of having the core elements of the brigade in theater, ready to fight, 
within 96 hours of lift-off.147 
As a matter of fact, the first two IBCT's organizational structures are much 
different from the Army's current brigade configuration. More importantly, this is an 
infantry-based force that relies upon a deliberate dismounted assault by combined arms 
units. Since this force will not initially have platform overmatch, its force effectiveness is 
based on the sum parts of the organization, training, doctrine and modern technology. 
The organization of the brigade, which is a combination of combined arm 
battalions and other supporting units grouped under the command of a brigade 
headquarter, includes: 
• The brigade headquarters and headquarters company (HHC); 
• The military intelligence company (MIC); 
• The signal company (SC); 
• Three combined arms battalions; 
> The combined arm battalion HHC includes a scout platoon and 
120mm mortar platoon mounted in light armored vehicles (LAVs),148 ten- 
man sniper squad equipped with heavy and medium caliber; 
> Three combined arms companies consisting of three infantry 
platoons (about 45 men each) in LAVs, one mobile gun system (MGS) 
platoon also in LAVs and one section each of 81mm and 60mm mortars. 
Each company has also a three-man sniper team; 
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> Each combined arm platoon has three nine-man squads with a 
"Javelin" command launch unit (CLU). Each combined arm squad has a 
sniper and a "Javelin" anti-tank system; 
> Every weapon squad has two three-man M-240B machine gun 
teams and two Javelin gunners with CLUs; 
The antitank company consists of "TOW-2-Bravo" and possibly migrating 
to the line of sight anti-tank weapon system (LOS AT); 
The recon, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron consists 
of three recon troops and one surveillance troop; The RSTA unit includes 
a multi-sensor troop of four unmanned air vehicles, ground and remote 
battlefield sensor systems ("Prophet II"—electronic intelligence-gathering 
system, electronic warfare sensors and ground surveillance radars); 
Each recon troop has three platoons of four LAVs per platoon. Each squad 
has a three-man scout team and is capable of both mounted and 
dismounted operations ("The idea is that the brigade will never be 
surprised," explained Lieutenant Cololnel Dana Pittard, commander of 3rd 
Brigade's 492-soldier RSTA formation;149) 
The surveillance troop consists of a unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) 
platoon with four UAVs and a ground sensor platoon; 
The engineer company of three combat engineer/mobility platoons 
mounted in LAVs and a bridging capability; (an engineer company, which 
focuses on mobility. Obviously, if this brigade is stopped or forced into a 
static situation, it is very vulnerable to artillery since they are LAVs;) 
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• The field artillery currently equipped with Ml98 155mm towed howitzers 
with the possibility of introducing High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System 
(HMARS), which is the wheeled version of the multiple launched rocket 
system MLARS; 
• The support battalion provide minimal essential logistical for the brigade; 
• The total troops in the brigade will number around 3,000 to 3,500 
personnel.150 
Overall, the IBCT's Operational Concept has been crafted with an underlying 
military operation in urban-terrain combat capability, and is able to extend those combat 
operations across the entire spectrum of conflict. It has to be a credible and lethal force, 
which can deploy rapidly and sustain itself without a large logistic footprint. In the future, 
each unit will be outfitted with all the latest kinds of point-and-shoot technologies 
connected through their vehicles to all of the other combat multipliers in the brigade to 
push more combat power down to the point of battle, down through the Tactical Internet 
("Ruggedised" Fieldworks 2000 computer platform), which increases the combat power 
available to the platoon leaders.151 
Initial Brigade Combat Team, Data can be accessed at the following site: 
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Figure 2. Provides an Example of a Combined Arms Battalion Organization of the Initial 
Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), http://www.benning.army.mil/BCTTF/ 
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Indeed, today's requirements for the U.S. Army formed new roles and missions 
for the Initial Brigade Combat Team, which in turn shaped its own organizational 
structure. The IBCT is a rapidly deployable combat brigade; therefore, the brigade 
combat team's missions are: 
• In Small-Scale Contingencies (SSC): it deploys rapidly, offers 
deterrence, contains the situation or shapes the situation and resolves that 
problem. 
• In Stability and Support Operations (SSO): a guarantor of the peace 
and protects the peacekeeping forces and separate belligerents. 
• In a Major Theater of War (MTW): it can perform several functions. It 
can conduct a mission supporting attack; it can also participate in the 
division's main attack with some augmentation and conducts economy of 
force, recon, screening, and limited guarding actions as well. 
Moreover, emphasizing the two core qualities of the brigade is necessary: 
• The first core is high mobility at all levels, strategic, operational and 
tactical. The C-17 and the C-5 are used as the primary means for 
deploying this strategically. However, the key quality is that everything 
in this brigade has to fit in a C-130 aircraft. The major requirement is, "If 
it does not fit into a C-130, it does not go into the brigade."152 
• The second core quality is achieving decisive combat action through 
deliberate dismounted infantry assault because the brigade has great 
situational awareness (having of RSTA). In other words, they can find the 
place where they want to fight, and then the infantry can dismount and 
conduct a dismounted assault of the any necessary objective. Moreover, 
this brigade will be optimized for urban and complex terrain (urban and 
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complex terrain are the military terms for fighting in the cities, or 
populated areas. Complex terrain consists of all other terrain than open 
and rolling, such as mountains, jungles, very wooded areas. Bosnia is an 
example of a complex terrain). 
Overall, the key characteristics of the organizational and operational concept of 
the Interim Brigade Combat Team are as follows: 
• To be full-spectrum capable, so it can be optimized for small-scale 
contingencies (SSC) but it can also do stability and support operations, 
and it contribute to the major theater war (MTW) fight. 
• Rapidly deployable, which means 96 hours from wheels-up of the first 
plane. IBCT should be combat-capable on arrival. 
• Freedom of maneuver with high tactical mobility and situational 
understanding provided by the reconnaissance, surveillance and target 
acquisition squadron (RSTA) to the brigade. 
• IBCT can achieve decisive action by deliberate dismounted infantry 
assault, which is the core quality, the cornerstone of this brigade. Unlike 
the current heavy force, which often fights mounted (Desert Storm is an 
example of this tactic) these three combined arm battalions will fight 
dismounted; however, with a lot of weapons systems in support. 
• These brigades will be equipped with commercial and government 
equipment that exists today. 
• IBCT will be best used in complex and urban terrain. Since the end of 
Desert Storm, potential adversaries will probably be reluctant to engage 
the U.S. Army in the open terrain and will engage units in complex and 
urban terrain. 
• Next intent with IBCT is to minimize the logistical and support footprint. 
• IBCT operates under a division, corps headquarters. 
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In summary, the transformation of the Initial Brigade Combat Teams is the first 
phase of the Army's three-phase strategy for transforming the current force. "The 
transformation of these two brigades at Fort Lewis, using current off-the-shelf 
technology, will give us an interim capability as we move toward our long-term goal of 
the Objective Force" said the Army Chief of Staff General, Eric K. Shinseki.153 The 
IBCTs will also serve to identify rapidly any necessary changes in doctrine, organization, 
equipment, training, and leader development required for the second phase, the Interim 
Force. 
The Interim Force will consist of the two IBCTs. The first IBCT to transform to 
the new design, the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, is scheduled to achieve Initial 
Operating Capability (IOC), the point at which the Army certifies the unit is capable of 
accomplishing brigade-level operations by December 2001. 
The second IBCT, the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, will achieve IOC by 
December 2002. The first two IBCTs will feature significantly different organizations 
from the Army's current brigade configuration. Another significant change is that the 
companies of the infantry battalions will be combined arms teams, consisting primarily of 
medium armored gun systems, infantry, and mortars. 
The Interim Force will be fielded primarily with off-the-shelf equipment and 
technological insertions and will provide immediate deployability and breakthrough 
maneuver capabilities to bridge the current gap between the Army's heavy and light 
forces until technology developments make fielding of the Objective Force possible. 
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The final phase of the Transformation, the Objective Force, will begin with fielding of 
"Future Combat Systems," currently being studied by the Army. The EBCT organization 
will enable the brigades to conduct operations across the full spectrum—from small-scale 
contingencies, such as Bosnia and Kosovo, to major theaters of war. 
"We do not know yet the exact shape of our future military," President Bush said, 
"but we know the direction we must begin to travel. On land, our heavy forces will be 
lighter. Our light forces will be more lethal. All will be easier to deploy and to 
sustain."155 
155
 David E. Sanger, "Bush Details Plan to Focus Military on New Weaponry," New York Times, 02.14.01. 
77 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
78 
VII.        THE INDEPENDENCE OF UKRAINE AND THE 
MILITARY ISSUE 
A.        THE   SOVIET   MILITARY   DOCTRINE   AND   COMBINED   ARMES 
CONCEPT 
This chapter explores the relationship between the Ukrainian military doctrine and 
the development of the Army of Ukraine after the declaration of its independence in 
1991. However, in order to understand the essence of the process of forming the Army of 
Ukraine (inherited from the former Soviet Army), it is necessary to briefly examine the 
essentials of Soviet Military Doctrine and in particular the Soviet Combined Arms 
Concept (CAC).156 
During the entire history of the Soviet Union, political and military leadership 
were linked through military strategy in preparing the nation for war. Taking the 
political leadership's instructions and the military doctrine, the Soviet military 
organized the strategic idea; planned how to deploy the armed forces, conducted and 
prepared the armed forces for war, and practiced controlling them during war. The 
political basis of military strategy directly influenced the military. Additionally, the 
specific relationship between military strategy and doctrine showed that any change in 
the theoretical base of one caused change in the other. The Soviet strategy provided the 
unity between military doctrine, and operational art. How military doctrine viewed the 
156
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characteristics of future war also guided military strategy. Simultaneously, strategy 
affected the formulation and perfection of military doctrine.157 
More importantly, previous Soviet political ideology and military doctrine 
stressed the inevitability of a clash with NATO, and the importance of the initial period 
of war marked by specific actions, such as mobilization, concentration, deployment of 
forces, and the conversion of national economies from peacetime to wartime. Under that 
doctrine, the primary tasks of the Soviet military were to cover the deployment of the 
main forces and disrupt the mobilization efforts of the enemy.158 
In fact, during almost the entire history of the Soviet Union, its military doctrine 
stressed the offense. The Soviet Army believed that they could defeat the West in a 
mobilization race and; therefore, the Soviet Army could mass the means of warfare to 
achieve the aims of the initial period of war, which was important in determining the 
subsequent course of the war. For this reason, their European strategy stressed 
neutralizing NATO's nuclear capability to force a decision in the initial period.159 The 
Soviet perception was that the greater degree of surprise they could achieve, the greater 
NATO's need for space and time to recover from the strategic situation in their favor. 
The Soviet military leadership believed that the initial period of a war defined its course 
and outcome.160 Under those circumstances, the Soviet Combined Arms Concept (CAC) 
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became the theoretical basis of Soviet military doctrine. The Soviet CAC was not merely 
cross-attachment or cross-reinforcement of units as in the United States. The Soviet 
Army meant much more by CAC than the task organization for combat. 
The CAC was an interacting process among the elements of the Soviet armed 
forces, which produced "joint effort ... on the basis of their close and uninterrupted 
interaction and the fullest exploitation of their capabilities."162 Moreover, the Soviet CAC 
simultaneously confronted its opponents with a variety of weapons systems of widely 
differing capabilities. The dynamic nature of Soviet CAC placed great emphasis on 
timing, tempo, depth of attacking forces, densities of weapons, along with relationships 
among forces and troop control (command and control in the U.S. Army's term). 
For a better understanding of the Soviet CAC, one should consider the Gulf War (1990- 
1991), when the Iraqi Army implemented the CAC, although unprofessionally, yet 
without decisive or effective result. General Norman Schwarzkopf, recalled: 
We knew that the Iraqis were students of the Soviets; the Soviets 
have what they call "a strategic pause." They accomplish one 
phase of their operation, they then pause there, they refuel, they re- 
arm, they re-equip, they replace the men that they have lost and 
then they rest, and after this strategic pause, they then carry on to 
the next phase of their offensive. That was their doctrine at that 
time. It was highly likely that they were going through a strategic 
pause ready to carry out the next phase.164 
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In fact, the Soviet CAC was not precisely the classic German "blitzkrieg," which 
stressed fluid, flexible and highly independent operations at all echelons.165 The Soviet 
CAC was disciplined, very rigid and explicitly formatted, even dogmatic in nature, and 
authoritatively embraced all elements of the Soviet Army.166 
As an operational method, the CAC addressed how the Soviet Army intended to 
fight. Fire, assault and maneuver characterized the Soviet CAC. Overwhelming fire 
support had been a keystone of the Soviet offensive operations in the Great Patriotic 
War and continued to be a major goal of the Soviet Army. Capitalizing on the shock 
effect of firepower and movement, Soviet attacks were envisaged as overwhelming, in 
great depth and unceasing; however, the purpose of the entire operation was 
maneuver.167 In its essence, the Soviet CAC required: 
• Maintenance of momentum  and freedom  of maneuver along 
multiple axes of advance. 
• Maximum rates of advance to prevent effective defense in depth. 
• A high degree of control by the central directing headquarters and 
close coordination among enemy elements. 
• Close timing of the multi-echeloned attacking forces to achieve the 
synergistic effect of tempo of operations.168 
Overall, if the Soviet Army applied the its CAC in reality, it would present an 
extremely formidable enemy; however, like all operational methods, the Soviet CAC 
had some weaknesses. 
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The extremely dogmatic and rigid application of the doctrine at the operational 
level discouraged a decentralized execution for maneuver warfare and created 
conditions that threatened the essence of the Soviet CAC.169 The centralized direction of 
the CAC by the Soviet General Staff demanded reliable and effective command, control 
and communications throughout operations, which would be one of the greatest 
problems for both sides on either a nuclear or conventional European battlefield. In 
addition, Soviet commanders had been conditioned to conduct all operations against a 
backdrop of overwhelming fire superiority, especially artillery. Therefore, conditions, 
which degraded or denied this advantage, would have a significant effect on the Soviet 
170 
attack doctrine and on the actions of the tactical commanders. 
Finally, the entire Soviet concept was based on tempo and timing among 
elements. Unforeseen events, which impeded the highly prized timing among 
cooperating units or the tempo of attacks, would have a major negative effect on the 
operations.171 Overall, some weaknesses of the Soviet CAC discussed above appear to 
be a significant shortcoming in the Soviet strategy. Indeed, war is subject to friction and 
uncertainty more so than any other form of human endeavor; therefore combat must 
.have a certain degree of flexibility.172 
In sum, military doctrine evolution in the former Soviet Union represented an 
amalgam of many factors. The effect of the international political environment and an 
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assessment of the probability of war from the political component of doctrine. 
The evolution of Soviet military doctrine reflected foreign doctrines, especially that of 
the German "blitzkrieg." Past Soviet experience taken, especially from the Great Patriotic 
War during 1941-1945, formed the Soviet perspective of war. Internal political, 
economic, and social constraints, as well as the nature of Soviet decision making fully 
supervised by the Communist Party, greatly affected the nature of doctrine. 
Technological innovation also had a key role. Therefore, the Soviet military doctrine 
arose from the interaction of these often-conflicting factors. 
B.        THE SOVIET ARMY LEGACY 
After the breakup of the Soviet Union and the proclamation of Ukraine's 
independence in 1991, in many ways, the Ukrainian military was facing difficult 
problems including the issue with its new military doctrine. The speed of the Soviet 
Union's breakup left its Armed Forces practically intact where they were deployed. 
Ukraine as the former republic on the western frontier inherited first-class force 
packages, which were part of the second strategic echelon of the former western and 
southwestern theaters of operation of the Warsaw Pact. 
On the ground, Ukraine gained control over five armies, one army 
corps, eighteen divisions (twelve motorized, four tank, and two 
airborne), three airborne brigades, three artillery divisions, and a 
host of combat support and combat service support units. It also 
inherited four air armies with assets that gave Ukraine the third 
largest air force in the world, including an inventory of long range 
bombers, transports, strike aircraft, reconnaissance and electronic 
warfare planes, tactical and air defense fighters, and training 
aircraft. The air defense contingent consisted of one air defense 
army and three air corps.173 
173 Stephen Olynyk, "Ukraine as a Post-Cold War Military Power," JFQ, 1997, p.! 
84 
Under those circumstances, the Armed Forces of Ukraine possessed one of the 
biggest parts of the huge Soviet war machine, equipped with nuclear weapons and 
comparatively modern conventional weapons, the forces totaled 780,000 personnel, 6,500 
tanks, more than 7,000 armored vehicles, up to 1,500 combat aircraft, more than 350 
ships and support vessels, 1,272 strategic nuclear warheads for ballistic carrier-missiles 
and more than 2,500 tactical nuclear weapons174; however, Ukraine got this military 
power without a clear understanding of the Armed Forces' roles and missions, in other 
words without a doctrine that reflected a new posture of Ukraine in the European and the 
world security system as a whole. Therefore, Ukraine certainly needed to have its own 
military doctrine as soon as possible because lacking a unified military doctrine would 
give each branch of the armed forces a chance to develop its own doctrine. In addition, 
from the beginning, the new Ukraine rejected the idea of being one of the world's 
military superpowers, decided to disarm all nuclear weapons and declared itself as a 
neutral, non-block nation. Additionally, in response to economic collapse, Ukraine began 
drastically to reduce the size of its armed forces. All these factors together had their 
strong specific impact on the process of defining the military doctrine and reforming the 
force structure of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.175   David Chu, while discussing the 
reformation of the U.S. Army, made an interesting observation, which is also valid for the 
Ukrainian Army: 
.... All these force structure templates represent roughly linear 
reductions in the force structure from the Cold War pattern. It is 
not surprising that our first post-Cold War structure would be a 
linear extrapolation from the Cold War structure. We know the 
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Cold War structure and are comfortable with it—we know how to 
manage and operate that structure.176 
In accordance with the Soviet Military Encyclopedia, a brigade was considered 
a tactical formation in the armed forces, which in terms of effective combat strength was 
smaller than a division. In the ground forces a brigade usually consisted of several 
infantry battalions (more rarely regiments), artillery battalions of the basic branches of 
troops, and subunits of special troops and the rear services. 
In the history of the Soviet Army, the largest number of brigades of active armies 
and the reserves of the Supreme High Headquarters existed during the time of the Great 
Patriotic War, especially in early 1943. In the postwar period establishing,. specializing 
and improving the brigades continued in the Soviet Armed Forces. At the same time a 
number of brigades (rifle, motorized rifle, tank, and others) were abolished.177 
As a matter of fact, the brigade-size structure, in particular brigades in the ground 
forces, was never considered as a basic ground forces structure either at the tactical or 
operational levels. Mostly, various types of Soviet Army's brigades were either under the 
direct control of the senior command of an army's (corps) headquarters and higher and as 
a rule brigades were intended to conduct some special tasks, such as reconnaissance, and 
sabotage, as well as air-assault and logistical missions. The "backbone" of the Soviet 
Army was indeed a regiment for the tactical operations and a division for the operational 
level. The Army of Ukraine merely inherited a similar organizational structure with 
specifically designed roles and missions without any considerable changes. Currently, the 
Army of Ukraine does not have any actual experience of deploying or possessing an army 
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based on the brigade-size units. Hence, the Ukrainian military and the civilian leadership 
decided to begin the process of reforming its Army to attain modern standards based on 
rapid deployability, lethality, agility and affordability. However, even though the 
medium-weight brigade-size combat force structure can provide all these features, 
creating this structure is quite a challenge for the Ukrainian Army. 
Therefore, in order not to "invent the wheel again" the Ukrainian Army must take 
a vigilant look at the U.S. Army's two-year experience, or at least evaluate some key 
elements of the U.S. Army's transformation strategy. These elements include: the 
common strategy, the multi-stage approach, some key components from the 
organizational structure of the Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), such as the structure 
of the recon, surveillance, and target acquisition squadron (RSTA), which would be 
suitable for an Ukrainian brigade. Finally, special attention should be given to the IBCT's 
Operational Concept that has been crafted with underlying military operations in urban 
terrain and combat capabilities across the entire spectrum of conflicts. 
Moreover, the Ukrainian military leadership must adjust its policy to make 
productive relationships with all branches of the state power, emphasizing public support 
and the support from the legislative and executive powers. Hence, the critical point of 
reforming the Army of Ukraine in the light of democratic transformations is the issue of 
civilian control over the military and the relationship between political and military 
leaders. Additionally, for Ukraine, the current and painful lack of funds should not simply 
break down the natural tendency of its Army to develop itself. Similarly to the U.S. 
Army, the Army of Ukraine is enjoying a period of peace in which to transform itself into 
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a new Army based on modern doctrine and force structure, where medium-weight 
brigades would be the "backbone" of the ground forces. 
Regarding the issue of developing new military doctrine related to the present 
conditions, the requirements for the basic parameters of the Army should be clearly 
defined and coordinated with the political objects and capabilities of Ukraine. Obviously, 
the Army should not be excessively strong, as it frightens neighbors and provokes 
counter-action; and the Army should not be too weak, as it threatens the state's security; 
and the Army should not be too expensive, as it drains the economy. Hence, balance 
should be maintained. Finally, it is not strength, or only strength, that is important. 
Yugoslavia and Iraq had rather strong and well-equipped armies; however, they could not 
effectively oppose a serious enemy possessing technological, organizational and doctrinal 
superiority. Therefore the new military doctrine has to form a template for the Ukrainian 
Armed Forces structure based on the probable nature of future war as well as valid 
political objectives. As a result, a new military doctrine must at least identify: 
• First: the basis of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, in other words, the priority 
of developing the land or sea or air-based services. 
• Second: the basis of defense, in other words, the priority of developing the 
rapidly deployable combined arms units, or maintaining heavy-arms 
division-based formations in the name of cost-efficiency. Therefore, the 
answer to the question "Is it better to have five or six divisions on paper or 
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five or six efficient brigades, plus an effective reservist training system?" 
has become one of the first priorities of the Ukrainian Army's reforms.178 
Above all, the Ukraine's political, and economic reality internal turmoil is 
obstacles to implementing the doctrine. In fact, social and economical complexity in 
Ukraine along with some other currently pressing problems preoccupy the Ukrainian 
military: however, force modernization, structure reformation, training and tactics, and 
other mission-related concerns are subjects for day-to-day discussions for the Ukrainian 
military. 
Obviously, Ukraine, a country of 50 million people, almost the size of France, and 
rich in natural resources, could be destined to play a central role in the new geopolitical 
environment of eastern and central Europe. Untangling the mass of problems related to 
the Ukraine's Armed Forces, including reforming its organizational structure, would 
augment the nation's prestige and well-being. Transforming, the Army of Ukraine from a 
heavy-arms division-based formations into rapidly deployable, combat-ready, cost- 
effective medium-weight brigade-size units is clearly the appropriate method of 
remediating this state of affairs. 
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VIII.     UKRAINE AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 
A.        THE INTERNATIONAL AND EXTERNAL DIMENSIONS 
The last decade of the 20th century witnessed radical changes in the European 
political and geographic landscape, resulting in the disintegration of the bipolar European 
security system formed during the Cold War. A number of newly emerging democracies, 
with Ukraine among them, have appeared in Europe. For many reasons, these countries 
had been deprived of their own statehood and ability to defend their national interests. 
Regarding Ukraine, its national security was identified and assessed by the 1997 Concept 
of the National Security of Ukraine. In accordance with that Concept, national interests 
and objectives of state security policy include: 
Elevating living standards; 
Improving social security; 
Reforming the national economy; 
Enhancing the efficiency of government structures; 
Strengthening the civil society; 
Fighting corruption; 
Protecting national resources.17 
With respect to these interests, a feature of independent Ukraine became the 
principle of non-alignment or neutrality. The pledge of constant neutrality, as expressed 
in the 1990 Declaration of State Sovereignty, was also reaffirmed by the early Military 
Doctrine adopted in 1993. An important distinction was already introduced at that early 
stage: "The commitment to neutrality and non-alignment must not prevent Ukraine from 
179
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a comprehensive participation in the all-European security architecture"180 including the 
cooperation in reforming the Armed Forces of Ukraine toward standards of modern 
warfare. However, its geostrategic position between the Western world lead by NATO, 
and Russia's sphere of influence has always been the common denominator of Ukraine's 
struggling political forces.181 Because ofthat, the reorganization and development of its 
Armed Forces has become one of the basic elements of statehood for Ukraine. This target 
is considered to be rather difficult because Ukraine is a relatively young democracy and 
consequently it does not have experience and traditions in the sphere of the national 
defense engineering. Today, the Ukrainian society, as well as its Armed Forces, is at a 
stage of social transformation from a totalitarian communist regime to a democracy. 
Ukraine experiences these transformational processes not only socially, but also 
economically. This transformation complicates on the process of the Armed Forces 
reformation. The economic crisis, which plagues the country, will have an effect on 
developing of the Armed Forces for a long time.182 Hence, one must consider these 
internal conditions and how they will influence the new Ukrainian Army. 
Also, changes in the external environment are no less significant and important. 
A new geopolitical European landscape is forming around Ukraine. Dynamic changes in 
the international environment create new risks and threats to the national security of 
Ukraine. In addition, the new century will bring even more intensive developments in 
science and technology. These will beget a military art, doctrine, strategy, and structures 
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of the Armed Forces. Hence, these external factors in forming the model of the Armed 
Forces of the 21st century is no less important than the internal factors. 
B.        DEPENDENCE OF THE MODEL OF ARMY ON THE POLITICAL- 
MILITARY STATUS OF UKRAINE 
The social-political conversions in Central and East Europe have resulted in 
cardinal geopolitical changes space in Europe. The first trend involved shaping a new 
European security system through its key components: NATO, (its basic element), the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union, the Western 
European Union, and the Council of Europe.183 This new system is distinct in that it 
pursues primarily political, economic and international legal means of ensuring the 
protection of the national interests and security of its members. 
As a matter of fact, Russia's has opposed the endeavor of Central European 
nations to fill the security vacuum in their region by joining NATO, which will lead to a 
new enlargement of the NATO. Russia does not wish NATO to become a Pan-European 
security structure and does not wish to see NATO accept new members, especially those 
neighboring on Russia's western border. Russia's policy hopes to reestablish its position 
in East Europe, and to secure political, economic, and military prevalence in the former 
republics of the USSR.184 In fact, the most urgent challenge of global and regional 
security becomes the tendency toward the renewal of bloc opposition. Therefore, 
Russia's most important demand of NATO has become a confession that Ukraine and the 
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Baltic states are zones of vital interest to Russia.185 Such a confession would mean that 
Russia's spheres of influence could eventually become a major problem for European 
security. 
The danger of such a situation for Ukraine can be: that in peacetime it can become 
a "buffer zone," caught between two military blocs. In a war Ukraine can become a 
battleground. For example, Russia and Belarus are already forming a joint regional 
force,   creating  common  defense  infrastructure,   and  developing   a joint  military 
1 R7 doctrine. These two threats can be removed with either annexation of Ukraine to 
NATO or joining Ukraine to the Tashkent Pact (the Collective Security Treaty),188 or by 
Ukraine's assuming a neutral and non-bloc status. However, the relations of Ukraine with 
NATO are defined as "special" relations by the NATO-Ukraine Charter that opens 
extensive opportunities for capitalizing on common interests.189 Either way, the existing 
national security prospects compel Ukraine to arrange its own defense, relying on its own 
Armed Forces. 
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C.        THE NEW THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF UKRAINE 
The termination of the period of the Cold War was marked by a display of new 
calls for international safety. Basic among these were: the increased distribution of the 
technology of producing weapons of mass destruction and systems of their delivery, 
clandestine migration, and narcotic trafficking, political, and religious extremism. All and 
all, these factors have brought real threats to the national security of Ukraine. Beyond 
this, Ukraine heavily depends on the sources of energy, trade, technical resources and 
information science of neighboring countries, such as Russia. This gives these countries a 
military-technical advantage over Ukraine. Additionally, these countries can apply 
coercive pressure to dominate Ukraine politically, militarily or economically. In fact, 
all these factors can, under certain conditions, present military threats. These new risks 
and challenges to Ukraine's national security places new demands on its Armed Forces. 
Therefore, these demands necessitate transforming the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and their 
doctrine and structure. 
Under these circumstances, the Army of Ukraine faces a new challenge: preparing 
troops and command cadres for limited or local wars, because "limited wars, while not 
preferred, are a frequent occurrence."191 In fact, 10 to 15 years ago this problem existed 
neither in Ukraine nor in the former Soviet Union. The main threat laid in a possible 
confrontation between the two most powerful military-political blocs: NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact. Furthermore, at that time it was assumed that when troops were being 
prepared for large-scale operations, they were theoretically ready to conduct combat 
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actions in low-intensity conflicts. Today the situation has changed; there is a pressing 
need to be prepared for local wars. This fact constant impacts the evolution of military 
art, including the military doctrine and a structure of the Ukrainian Army. 
In particular, the main features of any local armed conflict are its limited 
objectives, and scope, which mainly affects their territorial, economic, and political, 
interests, and the forces involved in the conflict. Local wars can occur in the form of 
border conflicts, military actions, armed incidents, and internal armed conflicts. A 
conflict that has affected a small part of a territory with a limited contingent of armed 
forces involved will be regarded as local.192 Therefore, for states, such as Ukraine, an 
armed conflict can be regarded as local if hostilities are confined to one strategic area. As 
a rule, a local armed conflict involves tactical and operational units of the Armed Forces 
without general mobilization. The basis of Ukraine's defense concept has already 
included a territorial principle of defense.193 This structure for guiding for the Armed 
Forces and the entire defense system provides for self-sustained execution of tasks by 
each territorial command. Under this system, a commander of territorial troops can use 
the military, and civil resources of a territory to interact with the corresponding civilian 
leaders. Obviously, the critical issue of civil-military relations with all the problems 
inherent to the newly emerging Ukrainian democracy has appeared in the sphere of 
national security.194 
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Concerning the nature of a low-intensity conflict, one should understand that a 
local armed conflict is a form of resolving national-ethnic, religious, political, territorial, 
and other non-fundamental disagreements by using armed forces both within a country 
and with respect to a neighboring state when it does not develop into what is known as 
"war." In accordance with FM 100-20 of the U.S. Army, a "low intensity conflict" is: 
.. .A political-military confrontation between contending states or groups 
below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition 
among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing 
principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to 
the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means, employing 
political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity 
conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain 
regional and global security implications.195 
In fact, owing to the geo strategic situation of Ukraine and to the fact that it lacks 
effective forces to conduct large-scale military operations, it can provide effective 
counteraction in a local armed conflict only with respect to neighboring states. Most of 
these states are either former USSR republics, which have close economic, social, and 
cultural, links with Ukraine, or former allies under the Warsaw Pact. However, today 
evidence suggests that in the foreseeable future a local war or an armed conflict could 
hypothetically draw Ukraine into a regional war. This leads to the conclusion that the 
greatest danger for Ukraine at present is the threat of a local armed conflict.196 Therefore, 
understanding the nature of local wars becomes essential, as does the evolution of arms, 
methods and forms of using armed force, which can serve as a basis for recommending 
organizational changes in the Armed Forces so they can execute their duties in armed 
conflicts of any scale. 
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The current state of the Ukraine's Armed Forces and of the possible problems on 
its borders show that in order to conduct successful operations in local armed conflicts in 
the foreseeable future, the Ukrainian Army will need to create independent operational 
groups of forces comprising different units under time constraints from several territorial 
commands, where combined arms units of the ground forces will play the key role. 
Unfortunately, today the Armed Forces of Ukraine have an insufficient number of 
combat-ready rapidly deployable sub-units, units, or combined arms units deployed on 
the territory of territorial commands. Probably, these forces will not be in a position to 
perform their tasks and missions independently in local armed conflicts, and so from the 
very outbreak of a crisis, building up forces in the area of threat will be necessary. 
This can be done primarily with battle-ready combined arms units deployed on the 
territory of other territorial commands as well as by committing other troops of Ukraine's 
Military organization.197 
Moreover, an analysis of local armed conflicts, such as in Kosovo, shows that 
direct preparation of combat action is usually conducted within a brief time span and in 
an abridged form.198 Should an armed conflict escalate, "green troops" ought to be 
prepared for combat action. However, the Armed Forced of Ukraine, which rely on 
conscription for their manpower acquisition and have mainly young, insufficiently 
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trained conscripts, will require quite a long time for this. Therefore, having rapidly 
deployable medium-weight combat brigade-size units will provide the most decisive 
solutions for possible threats. 
The understanding of general trends in modernizing of arms and equipment as 
well as methods of using them in local wars also provides a fresh impetus to the evolution 
of military affaires. It is important to stress the growing mobility of weapon systems and 
the depth and accuracy of their impact on targets. Furthermore, modem warfare is 
characterized by high dynamism and a broad scope. In order to maintain operational 
effectiveness and to minimize personnel losses from precision long-range weapons, it 
will be essential to disperse troops and at the same time to concentrate efforts in the 
direction of the main attack, which can be ensured by a timely maneuver of forces as a 
medium-weight. 
As a matter of fact, modern warfare is characterized by a rapid change in one's 
efforts. The combat experience of the Gulf War in 1991 shows that troops armed with 
highly effective weapons will not break through the defense but will look for vulnerable 
spots or bypass fortified areas. Obviously, there will be no breakthrough of the prepared 
defense in the foreseeable future. Instead, superiority of troops will more likely be 
achieved through bypassing the prepared defense and will be ensured by a massing of fire 
and using new weapon systems. This is indeed the backbone of the Initial Brigade 
Combat Team's (IBCT) operational concept recently created in the U.S. Army. 
In addition, one important trend resulting from upgrading weapon systems is the 
growing role and capabilities of command and control, intelligence, and the electronic 
warfare systems and the growing efficacy of combat support systems. As mentioned in 
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previous chapters, the U.S. Army command sees intelligence and electronic warfare 
activity as part of combat support activities. Soon these forces and assets could become a 
special element of tactical as well as operational formations. Already the capabilities of 
intelligence assets enable them promptly and efficiently to detect targets to the entire 
depth of enemy territory while command and control systems can allocate targets among 
weapon systems virtually in real time and electronic warfare systems can effectively 
disrupt enemy command and control systems as well as the state administration system. 
In fact, the primary feature of modern warfare focused on developing command 
and control, intelligence, and the electronic warfare systems has already found its 
confirmation in the IBCT's operational concept of conducting a battle. Fortunately, 
Ukraine has already possessed the technological potential for producing high-level 
electronic warfare systems, such as reconnaissance and surveillance systems. What the 
Army of Ukraine does not have is the modern combat force structure. Therefore, the 
IBCT's structure and the system of training with reliance on deliberate dismounted 
assault by combined arms units possessing greater situational awareness through the use 
of reconnaissance sub-units, such as RSTA, will be advisable for Ukrainian combined 
arms brigades. In sum, some recommendations are presented that are essential for the 
further development of the Army of Ukraine. 
• First, the ground forces should have combat-ready formations and units 
at a level sufficient to fight a local war. The basic principle of battling an 
enemy is inflicting maximum harm to the opponent while incurring 
minimal losses for one's own forces. In order to enhance the combat 
readiness and operational effectiveness of the troops, it is advisable, in 
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manpower acquisition, to shift to the contract basis and to the modern, 
mobile, deployable combat structure of the Army based on medium- 
weight brigade-size units. 
• Second, headquarters and troops should be equally prepared for both 
local wars and large-scale wars. In personnel training, it is essential to 
give a higher priority to developing reconnaissance and intelligence 
gathering and terrain orientation skills, ensuring an effective use of all 
types of available weapon systems and enhancing survivability in 
combat. 
D. EFFECT OF AN ECONOMIC SITUATION IN UKRAINE ON 
REFORMING ITS ARMED FORCES 
It is axiomatic that the worse the army is equipped, the greater its size must be, 
which is overall true for Ukraine. In contrast, the Secretary of the National Security and 
Defense Council (NSDC) Yevhen Marchuk stated, "The Ukrainian fighting forces must 
be of a European type."199 That idea comprised, in the first place, the best suitable army 
structure, its compatibility with the NATO's military structure, such as a high degree of 
rapid deployability, lethality, agility of an army's units along with appropriate civil 
control over the military and adequate funding. However, Ukraine's domestic economic 
problems make comparisons of the Ukrainian Army's with Western armies theoretical. 
In fact, Ukraine's economic crisis became the largest factor that fundamentally changed 
the situation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This crisis has resulted in a sharp reduction 
of the defense budget. Financial resources allocated from Ukraine's budget were 
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insufficient even to sustain its own Armed Forces. The figures cited below show that in 
1997 through 1999 the Ukrainian government substantially curtailed funding of the 
military sector. 
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Defense budget, 
% of GDP 
2.40 1.57 1.46 1.80 1.90 1.35 1.35 1.40 
Table 2. Provides the Funding of the Ukraine's Armed Forces 
During 1992—1999201 
This further complicated the situation, and the Ukraine's Ministry of Defense 
(MOD) could not afford to have full-scale military exercises from the division level, to 
purchase new weapons and to modernize current equipment sufficiently. Unfortunately, 
the FY-2000 created no basis for optimism either: the MOD could obtain as little as 
$180-200 million. According to NATO standards, Ukraine should have spent $5.5-7.5 
billion a year on developing modern, currently-used weapons. This amount equals the 
country's entire annual budget.202 
There is no economic grounds to expect any serious defense 
reform in Ukraine, unless the nation recovers its economy and 
accumulates a "critical mass" of people, that have the vision, 
courage, political will and support, capable of making tough 
choices in the defense sphere. Otherwise, the Government can only 
keep the Army at its minimal "survival" level, slightly reducing the 
personnel every year.203 
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Once there was a slogan in the Pentagon's Strategic Planning Department: 
"It is time to think—we are running out of money."204 Meanwhile their budget is a 
hundred times greater than Ukraine's military expenditures. Indeed, it would be nice if 
that American slogan became the main motto not only inside the Ministry of Defense but 
also for the executive as well as for the legislative branches of state power. 
E.        THE STATE PROGRAM OF THE UKRAINIAN ARMED FORCES 
REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT UNTIL 2005 
The main goal of the State Program of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Reform and 
Development, which was approved by the National Defense and Security Council and 
adopted by Presidential Decree in 2000, is an establishment of a modern Armed Forces, 
which will be "optimum in strength, mobile, well equipped, supported and trained, 
capable of fulfilling their missions in any environment and at the same time not a burden 
on the country's budget."205 Based on the Armed Forces functions the state program 
details the Armed Forces missions as the following: 
• Capable of dealing low intensity conflicts with peacetime force 
structure; 
• Provide mobilization readiness for a local or regional war; 
• Permanent readiness to participate in peacekeeping and 
humanitarian operations under the auspices of international 
organizations with a brigade-size force (up to 3,000 personnel).206 
Under these circumstances, the state program envisions establishing of the 
following structures: 
• Forward Defense Forces; 
• Main Defense Forces; 
• Strategic Reserve. 
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In fact, emphasis is given to the Forward Defense Forces that is the most mission- 
ready constituent of the Armed Forces designed for dealing with an armed conflict. 
The Forward Defense Forces consists of: 
• Strategic Conventional Deterrence Forces; 
• Rapid Reaction Forces, which are considered to be the main element of 
the future Ukrainian Armed Forces, and Cover Troops.207 
Providing that, the Ukraine's ground forces are the largest component of the 
Armed Forces and constitute the backbone of the Armed Forces. According to the state 
program, 
The main purpose of the Ground Forces reform and development is 
the establishment of a Euro-Atlantic type of force, efficient, mission 
capable and equipped with state-of-the-art weapons and equipment, 
capable to qualitatively perform assigned missions. One of the ways 
to achieve this goal is to improve the Ground Forces formation and 
unit organization. The peculiarity of this process will be a shift from 
"division and unit" to "brigade and battalion" organization. This 
will enhance the mobility, independence, fire and strike force of 
formations and units.208 
Moreover, this program emphasizes further optimization of the Armed Forces' 
strength by dealing not only with the strength reduction, but also with re-organizing and 
improving all organizational and functional elements. In particular, the four divisions of 
the ground forces will be reformed into detached mechanized brigades in order to 
modernize the Armed Forces. Obviously, their numerical strength will diminish, but 
battle-readiness and mobility will definitely increase as a result of artillery and air- 
defense facilities. Another fifth division will be adopting a brigade-based system with 
two—three brigades included.209 In general, the total strength of the Ukrainian Armed 
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Forces by the end of 2005 will be 295,000 military personnel.210 Overall, taking into 
account such structural transformations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: 
.... One of the key principles of the military reform in Ukraine 
should be based on the development of capabilities designed for 
the identification of threats and early containment of conflicts. 
Given the limited combat readiness of troops and low mobilization 
capabilities, priorities in the development of Ukraine's Armed 
Forces should include: an increase in the potential of military 
intelligence; development of rapid deployment forces capable of 
inflicting unacceptable losses on the enemy and thereby containing 
an escalation of aggression. A fully-fledged air mobile brigade, 
capable of fighting in border areas within 48 hours, would be more 
useful than a cumbersome Army corps short of resources.211 
In sum, the priority of any function of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will depend 
on a degree of urgency of the corresponding threat. Today's world is marked by an 
increase in crisis situations, resulting in different types of military conflict. These 
conflicts are constantly influencing the development of international relations and create 
serious threats to states national security, including Ukraine. The latter cases have often 
developed from local, regional conflicts to those involving the participation of a coalition 
of states against one state. Such conflicts, which have occurred in Chechnya, Yugoslavia, 
Transnestria, Nagomiy Karabakh, touch national interests of Ukraine, in particular—loss 
of petroleum and gas supplies, arms and drugs smuggling, increase of refugees and so 
forth. Under modem conditions, any military conflict having the potential to develop into 
local, regional or full-scale wars makes the situation in neighboring regions explosive, 
and the world fragile. The extremely important geopolitical location of Ukraine does not 
permit the Ukrainian Armed Forces to disregard nearby events. The main demand to the 
"
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new model of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will be its ability to neutralize threats and 
challenges, which took place during the last decade of 20th century and, probably, will 
tend to increase in the future. So long as such threats are multilateral and have a wide 
spectrum from the local to global, then the new model of the Armed Forces of Ukraine 
cannot be limited to any one function. 
Furthermore, a primary feature from the experience of conducting contemporary 
armed conflicts and wars is a special role played by rapid reaction forces, which should 
be based on a new combat medium-weight brigade-size structure. As a matter of fact, this 
medium-weight brigade solution will allow the Army of Ukraine to begin the 
transformation process to a full spectrum force better able to deal with various types of 
military operations and to bring the Army of Ukraine to modem standards of Western 
armies where the U.S. Army plays the dominant role. Notably, the decision to transform a 
portion of the Ukrainian Army into medium-weight combat groups based on a brigade's 
structure appears compelling. The geo-strategic environment will likely call for the rapid 
deployment of high performance combined arms forces in any region of Ukraine and 
abroad äs a part of peacekeeping/peacemaking forces. In many small-scale contingencies, 
medium-weight brigade-size units appear more versatile than pure mechanized infantry 
units. Additionally, there will be the need to have theater forces that have high firepower, 
operational agility, and a low logistics footprint. This provides medium-weight brigade- 
size units the capacity to operate effectively in a military environment under direct and 
indirect fire. These brigades are optimized to the real challenges of foreign as well as 
domestic dimensions of Ukraine's political circumstances. Indeed, a move toward the 
medium-weight aero-motorized concept would put the Army of Ukraine firmly on the 
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path toward a more operationally agile force of 21st century without calling for either 
technological or budgetary magic. 
It is important for Ukraine to take advantage of the current 
situation when there is no urgent military threat. This time must be 
spent efficiently for achieving a broad consensus on the following 
issues: what Ukraine needs the Armed Forces for; how much 
would be enough to satisfy these requirements; what price tag is 
affordable for society today and in the future; what ought to be 
done in order to meet any credible threat when it indeed appears. 
The Ukrainian Armed Forces today is in the process of transformation. As a 
result, on the one hand there should be heavy emphasis on research, model-building and 
theory. On the other hand, there are the practical realities of maintaining combat ready, 
trained forces with almost no funding and deteriorating equipment. Indeed, transforming 
the Army of Ukraine in order to be responsive to the diverse challenges of the 21st 
century will be a continuing challenge. 
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IX.    CONCLUSIONS 
When answering questions that have been used to frame this thesis, one should 
remember that while periods of peace should be respected, peace is not a permanent 
condition in world affairs. Recent events suggest that the time and opportunity to prepare 
for future conflicts may not last as long as many had hoped a few years ago. Even small 
nations can no longer be prevented from building total war capacity—whether nuclear or 
conventional. What is worse, new technologies make it possible even for small groups of 
perpetrators to inflict ever more chaos and dangers for nations around the world. 
The termination of the Cold War was marked by new calls for international safety, threats 
which include the increased distribution of the technology of producing weapons of mass 
destruction and systems of their delivery, clandestine migration, and narcotic trafficking, 
political, and religious extremism. All together, these factors are capable, under certain 
conditions, to require military counter-measures for threats to the national security of the 
United States and to Ukraine as well. 
The U.S. Army has undergone at least five major reorganizations since the end of 
World War II. As a matter of fact, all major armed conflicts of the Cold War era that 
determined the U.S. Army's reformations were outside of Europe. However, the essence 
of four major reorganizations was that the U.S. Army needed to develop a credible 
deterrent, reflecting America's concern with the defense of Western Europe, where it 
faced the prospect of being overwhelmed by the numerically superior Soviet Army. For 
several decades up to the Gulf War, the U.S. Army focused on rebuilding its forces and 
adjusting doctrine for conventional war, and for defending Western Europe against a 
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possible attack by the Warsaw Pact forces. The early 1990s brought significant changes 
to the world and the U.S. Army. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War presented threats 
that were more ambiguous and regionally focused. However, the U.S. Army remained 
configured according to its Cold War structure: either very heavy armored and 
mechanized units armed with large numbers of heavy tracked vehicles or very light 
infantry-type units that are primarily foot mobile. In fact, the improvements in tactical 
mobility came at the expanse of strategic mobility. The U.S. Army became progressively 
heavier and more difficult to transport. 
At the time of the Gulf War the U.S. strategy established exacting standards for 
the employment of military forces. Forces would only be employed where clear-cut 
objectives had been established. When military power was used, it would be applied with 
overwhelming force to ensure quick and decisive victory with minimum casualties. 
However, the Gulf War exposed several features of the U.S. Army's light-heavy force 
structure. The most significant among them was the absence of medium-weight force 
structure, which would be able to combine the excellent strategic mobility, rapid 
deployability of the light-infantry Divisions, and overwhelming operational mobility, 
lethality and survivability of the heavy-armored force. The experience reconfirmed that 
the U.S. Army had lacked the medium forces that combine a degree of mobility, 
firepower, and protection greater than the generally foot-mobile light forces, yet are less 
strategically and operationally cumbersome than the heavy-armored and mechanized 
units. Therefore, the medium-weight brigade-size units seem just the right size to 
combine arms (armor, infantry, artillery, engineers) due to new technological advantages, 
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which impose its lethality and survivability, while also overcoming the deployability 
shortfalls of the U.S. Army divisions. As a result, the objective of the U.S. Army 
transformation was erasing the distinction between heavy and light forces that would 
make light forces more lethal, survivable, and tactically mobile, and heavy forces more 
strategically deployable and agile with a reduced logistical footprint. 
Regarding the issue of funding for the new transformation strategy of the U.S. 
Army, it would be interesting to recall what Marshall Tyrren, a French military leader in 
the court of King of France Lydovik the XIV, said when responding to a question about 
the most important elements of a war. He wisely responded, "Only three things are 
necessary: first-^-money; second—money; and third—money!" In fact, the success of the 
new transformation strategy connects with the budget issue, which involves the specific 
relationships between the Congress and for the U.S. Army. Therefore, the Congress by 
adopting the FY-2001 budget confirmed its strong support the U.S. Army's 
transformation strategy. In sum, the U.S. Army, with the strong support from the 
Congress and President G.W. Bush's administration, is willing to take advantage of the 
current favorable conditions for success: 
• Relatively peaceful world events; 
• Unrivaled economic prosperity; 
• Overwhelming technological progress. 
Overall, this thesis has confirmed that in order to become more deployable and 
maintain lethality, the U.S. Army has fielded a prototype medium-weight brigade-size 
force that will use off-the-shelf systems and initiate the development of concepts, 
111 
organizational design, and training for the future of the U.S. Army called "Objective 
Forces." Fortunately, the U.S. Army has time to deal with this issue. 
Analyzing the necessity of the Ukrainian Army's reformation, which also focuses 
on moving from the current large division-based structure to a modern medium-weight 
brigade-size Army, this thesis highlighted the two-year experience of the U.S. Army 
Transformation Strategy. This experience should be studied and most likely will be a 
useful guide for reforming the Army of Ukraine. For this reason, there should be heavy 
emphasis on research, model-building and theory. On the other hand, there are the 
practical realities of maintaining combat readiness, trained forces with almost no funding 
and deteriorating equipment. 
Therefore, in order to be successful in reforming, the Ukrainian Army must take a 
vigilant look at the two-year experience of the U.S. Army transformation. These elements 
include: a common strategy between the political and military leadership, a multi-stage 
approach through the entire process of the Army transformation, in particular, some key 
components from the organizational structure of the Initial Brigade Combat Team 
(IBCT), such as a Recon, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition Squadron (RSTA). 
As was confirmed during IDEX-2001,213 the annual defense exhibition in Abu Dhabi, the 
United Arab Emirates, Ukraine already possesses the technological potential for 
producing high-level electronic warfare systems, such as reconnaissance and surveillance 
systems. What the Army of Ukraine does not have is a modem combat force structure. 
~
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In fact, the IBCT's structure and training provides an infantry-based force, which 
relies on a dismounted assault by the combined arms units who possess greater situational 
awareness through reconnaissance sub-units, such as RSTA. Therefore, this warfighting 
concept is advisable for Ukrainian combined-arms brigades, which recently started to 
transform from mechanized divisions. 
Special attention should be given to the IBCT's Operational Concept crafted for 
military operations in urban terrain. It has the capability of extending those combat 
operations across the entire spectrum of conflict. All together, these elements will be 
useful for the future developing of the Ukrainian ground forces based on medium-weight 
brigade-size units. 
One lesson from the U.S. Army's experience is crucial for the successful 
reforming of the Army of Ukraine. The Ukrainian military must adjust its policy to 
establish productive relationships with both executive and legislative branches of the 
government. Hence, the critical point of reforming the Army of Ukraine in the light of 
democratic transformations is the issue of civilian control over the military and the 
relationship between political and military leaders. 
Concerning the funding issue, one should understand that, for Ukraine, the current 
and painful lack of funds should not simply undermine the natural tendency of its Army 
to develop itself. Moreover, the priority of any function of the Armed Forces of Ukraine 
will depend on the degree of urgency of the corresponding threat. So long as such threats 
are multilateral and have a wide spectrum from the local to global, then the new model of 
Armed Forces for Ukraine cannot be limited to any one function. 
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Furthermore, a primary feature from the experience of conducting contemporary 
armed conflicts and wars is a special role played by rapid reaction forces, which should 
be based on a new combat medium-weight brigade-size structure. Similarly to the U.S. 
Army, the Army of Ukraine is enjoying a period of peace in which it can transform itself 
into a new Army based on modern doctrine and force structure, where medium-weight 
brigades will be the key element, the "backbone" of the ground forces of Ukraine. 
Above all, despite some large economic and technological differences between 
the U.S. Army and the Army of Ukraine and the system of conscription as well, a couple 
of recommendations that would be beneficial for the further development of the 
Ukraine's Army should be made: 
• First, the ground forces should have combat-ready formations and units 
at a level sufficient to fight a local war. The basic principle of battle 
actions of such an armed force is inflicting maximum damage to the 
opponent while receiving minimal losses for one's own forces. In order 
to enhance the combat readiness and operational effectiveness of the 
troops, it is advisable, in manpower acquisition, to shift to the contract 
basis and to the modern, mobile, deployable combat structure of the 
Army based on medium-weight brigade-size units. 
• Second, headquarters and troops should be equally prepared for both 
local war and large-scale war. In personnel training, it is essential to give 
a higher priority to developing reconnaissance and intelligence gathering 
and terrain orientation skills, ensuring an effective use of all types of 
available weapon systems and enhancing survivability in combat. 
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As a matter of fact, the medium-weight brigade solution will allow the Army of 
Ukraine to begin the transformation process to a full spectrum force better able to deal 
with various types of military operations and to bring the Army of Ukraine to the modem 
standards of Western armies where the U.S. Army plays the dominant role. Notably, the 
decision to transform a portion of the Ukrainian Army into medium-weight combat 
groups based on a brigade's structure appears compelling. 
Finally, this is optimized to the real challenges of external as well as internal 
dimensions of Ukraine's political circumstances. Indeed, a move toward the medium- 
weight aero-mobile concept would put the Army of Ukraine firmly on the path toward a 
more operationally agile force of the 21st century without calling for either technological 
or budgetary magic. However, transforming the Army of Ukraine in order to be 
responsive to the diverse challenges of the 21st century will be a continuing challenge. 
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